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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
Researchers have long been interested in understanding how 
corporate executives, who sit at the helm of the modern firm, shape 
the firm’s culture, strategy, and ultimately, its performance 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). While there have been 
longstanding debates regarding the exact magnitude of executive 
influence on firm outcomes (Beatty and Zajac, 1987), growing 
evidence suggests that managerial effects on performance are 
significant (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Hambrick and Quigley, 
2014; Mackey, 2008) and have been increasing over the last several 
decades (Quigley, Crossland, and Campbell, 2017; Quigley and 
Hambrick, 2015). Accordingly, a large stream of research has 
examined the effect of executive characteristics on firm strategy and 
performance; and on how executives are evaluated by stakeholders 
such as the board of directors, financial analysts, and journalists (for 
reviews, see Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Canella, 2009 and Westphal 
and Zajac, 2013). 
Although this large body of literature on corporate leadership 
is diverse in many dimensions, the studies in this area typically 
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share an underlying (if implicit) belief that social forces are the 
primary driver of cognition and behavior. In Hambrick and Mason’s 
(1984) influential early conceptualization of upper echelons theory, 
the actions of corporate executives are rooted in personalized 
interpretations of their environment that are formed from personal 
experiences and socialization processes. It therefore follows that 
observable sociodemographic variables would be viewed as useful 
proxies for the actual psychological processes shaping executive 
behavior. Consistent with this notion, upper echelons scholars have 
found that executive characteristics such as age, education, 
functional background, and social class background are predictive of 
firm strategy and corporate outcomes (Finkelstein et al., 2009). The 
behavioral theory of corporate governance formalized by Westphal 
and Zajac (2013) similarly stresses the importance of socialization 
and personal experience in shaping behavior, while also highlighting 
the importance of social context. In this vein, behavioral governance 
scholars have demonstrated that the institutions, networks, and 
social relationships in which individuals are embedded play an 
important role in shaping both executive actions and stakeholder 
evaluations of those actions (Westphal and Zajac, 2013). 
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1.1 Formidability signals in the executive realm 
 
While acknowledging the relevance of these social factors, I 
suggest that there is the potential to substantially advance our 
understanding of executive behavior by considering a very different 
perspective; namely, one that is rooted in biological rather than 
social forces. Indeed, recent years have witnessed a burgeoning 
body of research that uses an evolutionary biology perspective to 
examine leadership-relevant behaviors, perceptions, and outcomes, 
showing (among other things) that they are significantly a function of 
biological signals of fighting ability, known as formidability signals.  
Although such signals, which are present in the voice, face, 
and body of individuals (Sell et al., 2009a; Sell et al., 2010), may at 
first appear relevant only in humanity’s more primitive, distant past, 
evidence suggests that their evolutionary significance continues to 
influence decision-making in the modern context. Indeed, very 
recent research has argued that possessing formidability signals is 
associated with a variety of tendencies, including aggressiveness, 
deceptiveness, uncooperativeness, proneness to anger, and social 
dominance orientation; and furthermore, that naive evaluators tend 
to associate formidability signals with these tendencies (e.g., Carré 
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et al., 2009; Deska, Loyd, and Hugenberg, 2017; Geniole, 
MacDonell, and McCormick, 2017; Haselhun et al., 2014; Price et 
al., 2011; Sell et al., 2009b; Stirrat and Perrett, 2010). Additionally, 
recent research in the political realm has found that individuals who 
exude formidability are preferred as leaders, especially when 
evaluators perceive their environment to be highly threatening or 
competitive (e.g., Blaker and Van Vugt, 2014; Spisak et al., 2012; 
Tigue et al., 2012). As evidence of the potential significance of these 
biological signals in the executive realm, a study examining CEO 
facial width-to-height-ratio—an important formidability signal in the 
face—found that it was positively related to firm performance, and 
that this effect is strengthened when the CEO is heading a 
cognitively simple leadership team (Wong, Ormiston, and Haselhun, 
2011). 
While the recent studies mentioned above are tantalizing in 
suggesting that formidability signals may play an important role in 
shaping both executives’ behavior and evaluators’ assessment of 
executives, there is currently very little research that examines their 
effect in the corporate leadership context. I suggest that attention to 
explaining how and why formidability signals may influence 
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leadership-relevant behaviors and perceptions – based on principles 
from evolutionary biology – can complement corporate leadership 
research that is based on more social explanations. Accordingly, the 
three chapters in this dissertation shed greater light on the role of 
formidability signals in the executive realm.  
1.2 Chapters 
 
1.2.1    Chapter 2. Facial width-to-height ratio and behavioral 
tendencies 
The study in Chapter 2 examines whether the facial width-to-
height ratio (fWHR)—a formidability signal in the face—is predictive 
of behavioral tendencies in a sample of business executives. A large 
number of studies have found that high fWHR is predictive of 
antisocial behavior, and that naïve observers rate high fWHR 
individuals as being more antisocial (Anderl et al., 2016; Carré & 
Mccormick, 2008; Geniole et al., 2014; Geniole et al., 2015; Goetz et 
al., 2013; Haselhun & Wong, 2011; Stirrat & Perett, 2010). However, 
research examining the link between fWHR and behavior has been 
criticized for relying on small samples and for being mostly 
laboratory-based (Kosinski, 2017). Addressing these limitations, 
Kosinski (2017) examined the link between fWHR and antisocial 
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behavior using real-world data on self-reported behavioral 
tendencies for a large sample of participants and failed to find 
significant relationships. However, Kosinski’s study suffers from its 
own important limitation, namely, a reliance on self-reported data, 
which may suffer from social desirability bias (Atkins & Woods, 
2002). To address the limitations of both Kosinski’s research, as well 
as other prior research, we utilize self- and other-reported ratings of 
behavioral tendencies for a large sample of executives. We were 
also able to avoid the problem of naïve raters, i.e., that naïve raters 
could be biased by the target’s fWHR when making evaluations of 
behavioral tendencies, because the other-ratings we examine were 
provided by colleagues who reported knowing the focal executive 
well.  
Over all, we find very little evidence for a link between fWHR 
and behavioral tendencies in our sample of executives. We argue 
that our results present the possibility of an evolutionary mismatch 
(Li Van Vugt & Colarelli, 2017), whereby fWHR may predict social 
perceptions, but not behavior. In other words, since the modern 
world differs markedly from the violent ancestral conditions in which 
human psychological mechanisms evolved, social evaluations 
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formed based on fWHR, which likely served an adaptive function in 
the evolutionary past, may no longer be accurate. Our results also 
indicate that research exploring the link between formidability signals 
and outcomes at the corporate level should focus on how these 
signals affect social perceptions rather than behavior.  
1.2.2    Chapter 3. CEO vocal masculinity and CEO 
compensation  
The study in Chapter 3 explores how CEO vocal 
masculinity—a formidability signal referring to the deepness of the 
CEO’s voice—shapes the board’s decisions on CEO compensation. 
A large stream of research in evolutionary psychology indicates that 
having a masculine voice is beneficial to individuals in leadership 
roles. However, how this plays out at the apex of the corporate 
hierarchy is not clearly understood. We contend that CEO vocal 
masculinity positively influences CEO compensation through two 
primary mechanisms—influencing directors’ perception of CEO 
quality, and directors’ perception of the CEO’s willingness to retaliate 
against board members critical of CEO compensation. We identify 
these mechanisms by testing the effects of two moderating 
conditions that strengthen each of these mechanisms—industry 
competitiveness and CEO power. We also examine the moderating 
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effect of female directors on the compensation committee, arguing 
that a greater proportion of female directors on the compensation 
committee reduces the effect both the quality and the threat biases.  
We conducted longitudinal analyses in a unique dataset 
consisting of CEO interviews and speeches for UK FTSE 100 firms 
from 2004 to 2013 and found support for our predictions. Our study 
offers three key contributions. First, we contribute to the corporate 
governance literature more broadly by introducing a novel 
evolutionary psychology perspective to study how CEO vocal 
masculinity influences CEO compensation. In particular, our 
examination of the boundary conditions that characterize the CEO 
vocal masculinity-CEO compensation relationship contributes to a 
non-deterministic understanding of how vocal masculinity influences 
governance outcomes. Second, we contribute to the executive 
compensation literature by examining the link between CEO vocal 
masculinity and directors’ perceptions of threat as a mechanism by 
which CEO vocal masculinity influences CEO compensation. While 
past research has examined how the CEO’s past behavior and the 
CEO’s objective ability to retaliate affect formal evaluations issued 
by salient stakeholders such as financial analysts (Westphal & 
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Clement, 2008) and journalists (Westphal & Deephouse, 2011), prior 
research has not explored how seemingly trivial factors—such as the 
masculinity of the CEO’s voice—could also have a similar affect. 
Third, our research contributes to the literature on gender diversity in 
the corporate elite. While some scholars have argued that gender 
differences play a significant role at the apex of the organization 
(Chen, Crossland, & Huang, 2016; Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Levi, Li, 
& Zhang, 2014), other scholars have argued that male and female 
corporate leaders differ greatly from their counterparts in the general 
population and are in fact, more similar to each other (Adams & 
Ragunathan, 2013; Bertrand & Hollock, 2001; Economist, 2015). By 
showing evidence that gender differences are important in explaining 
board decision-making, our results lend support to the view that 
gender differences matter even at the very top of the corporation.  
1.2.3    Chapter 4. Board political ideology and the selection of 
masculine CEOs  
The study in Chapter 4 explores whether the benefits that 
accrue to CEOs who possess formidability signals are contingent on 
differences in audience beliefs. Specifically, we study how directors’ 
political ideologies, or in other words, their positions on the 
conservative-liberal spectrum, affect their preference for CEO 
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successors who possess more masculine faces and voices. 
Integrating research on evolutionary psychology, political ideology, 
and behavioral corporate governance, we argue that conservative 
directors are more threat sensitive than liberal directors, which will in 
turn shape their proclivity to pick masculine CEOs. We also examine 
whether the effect of political conservatism on the preference for 
masculine CEOs is amplified by contextual conditions that connote 
actual threat, specifically, poor firm performance and low industry 
munificence.  
We tested our predictions using a sample of CEO succession 
events at S&P 1500 firms from 2007 to 2013 and found general 
support. Our study makes three major contributions. First, we 
contribute to the CEO succession literature by exploring a research 
question that is surprisingly understudied: Why do CEOs look the 
way they do? By illustrating that directors’ political ideologies affect 
their leadership preferences, our study offers novel insight into the 
psychological process behind CEO selection decisions. Second, we 
contribute to the corporate diversity literature. While much of the 
existing research has focused almost exclusively on factors such as 
social class background, gender, and race as the basis of 
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preferential treatment for some executives over others, we add to 
this conversation by highlighting that differences in masculinity can 
affect outcomes even among those who are generally assumed to 
be the most privileged in the corporate world (white, upper-class, 
males). Third, we contribute to implicit leadership theory by arguing 
that susceptibility to specific leadership prototypes with deep 
evolutionary roots vary among individuals. While the importance of 
individual variation in evolutionary adaptations has been recognized 
since the time of Charles Darwin, this notion has only received 
limited attention in the leadership literature. 
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Chapter 2. A Case of Evolutionary Mismatch? 
Why Facial Width-to-Height Ratio May Not 
Predict Behavioral Tendencies 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study contributes to the growing literature linking physical 
characteristics and behavioral tendencies by addressing the current 
debate on whether a person’s facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) 
predicts antisocial tendencies. In particular, we avoid the social 
desirability bias that may result from the use of self-reports regarding 
behavioral tendencies, and instead capture behavioral tendencies 
that are both self- and other-rated. Our other-rated measures, drawn 
from a large sample of business executives, come from raters who 
reported knowing the focal individual well, thus also reducing the 
biased judgments that fWHR might trigger among naïve raters. With 
this improved research design, we find little evidence for a link 
between fWHR and antisocial tendencies, consistent with Kosinski’s 
(2017) study. We discuss the implications of our robust findings as 
suggestive of a potential evolutionary mismatch. 
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2.1    Introduction  
 
As part of the burgeoning body of evolutionary psychology 
research linking physical characteristics and behavioral tendencies, 
a consensus appeared to emerge suggesting that facial width-to-
height ratio (fWHR) predicts a host of antisocial tendencies in males, 
including threat behavior (Geniole et al., 2015), deception and 
exploitation (Geniole et al., 2014; Haselhun & Wong, 2011; Stirrat & 
Perett, 2010), trait dominance (Carré & Mccormick, 2008), physical 
aggression (Goetz et al., 2013), and overall psychopathy (Anderl et 
al., 2016). An evolutionary explanation emphasizes that in violent 
ancestral environments, high fWHR males were more protected from 
fatal blows to the face and thus more likely to prevail in physical 
altercations (Stirrat, Stulp, & Pollet, 2012). This suggests further that 
high fWHR individuals were more effective ancestrally in garnering 
social influence through threat and intimidation, leading humans to 
develop psychological adaptations that calibrate antisocial 
tendencies to fWHR. Evidence showing the relevance of fWHR in 
shaping male behavior (but not female behavior) can be explained in 
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terms of males disproportionately representing both the perpetrators 
and victims of violent conflicts in cultures across time and space 
(Daly & Wilson, 1988). Researchers have also proposed that the 
relationship between fWHR and antisocial tendencies is mediated by 
testosterone (Carré & McCormick, 2008), but this prediction has only 
received mixed support (Bird et al., 2016; Lefevre et al., 2013). 
Although various studies have reported a positive relationship 
between fWHR and antisocial tendencies, a recent large-scale study 
by Kosinski (2017) has called into question this growing consensus 
on the significance of fWHR. Kosinski’s (2017) study is noteworthy 
insofar as it found very little evidence linking fWHR and self-reported 
behavioral tendencies (e.g., cooperativeness, militarism, 
trustworthiness, sympathy, and morality), and that little evidence was 
generally stronger for females than for males. What makes 
Kosinski’s (2017) study particularly compelling is that his 
(non)findings were obtained using a large real-world sample, in 
contrast to prior work, which relied on a small number of participants, 
and was mostly laboratory-based. Indeed, Kosinski (2017) 
speculated that the frequency of marginally significant p values 
observed in prior published studies on fWHR and behavioral 
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tendencies may reflect degrees of freedom and “file drawer” 
problems. 
2.2    Contribution 
 
Kosinski’s (2017) contribution is undoubtedly important in 
both highlighting an alternative position on the relevance of fWHR for 
behavioral tendencies, and identifying specific limitations of prior 
research in this area. If there is little evidence supporting the notion 
that fWHR predicts behavioral tendencies, this would open the 
possibility of an evolutionary mismatch (Li Van Vugt & Colarelli, 
2017), whereby fWHR may predict differences in social judgments of 
naïve evaluators (as found in prior research; Deska, Lloyd, & 
Hugenberg, 2017; Deska, Lloyd, & Hugenberg, 2018; Efferson & 
Vogt, 2013; Geniole et al., 2017; Lefevre & Lewis, 2014), but not 
behavioral tendencies. In other words, because the modern world 
differs in important ways from the violent ancestral environments in 
which human psychological mechanisms developed, naïve social 
judgments formed based on fWHR, which may have been adaptive 
in the evolutionary past, may no longer be accurate. However, we 
suggest that before advancing such a concept with confidence, it is 
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necessary to first address an additional important but under-
examined limitation found in some of the studies examining the link 
between fWHR and behavioral tendencies (including Kosinski, 
2017); namely, a reliance on self-reports with its attendant social 
desirability bias [cf. the discussion of Kosinski’s (2017) results in 
Eisenbruch et al. (2017)]. Indeed, some researchers suggest that 
this bias can explain the persistently low or even negative correlation 
between self-reported vs. other-reported ratings of behavioral 
tendencies (Atkins & Woods, 2002).  
Therefore, in this study, we seek to extend current 
understanding on the relevance of fWHR and behavioral tendencies 
by explicitly addressing the above-mentioned limitations in prior 
research, i.e., a reliance on small-sample sizes and/or self-reported 
data. Specifically, we offer a large-scale study on the association 
between fWHR and behavioral tendencies that employs both self- 
and other-rated measures in a sample of business executives. An 
additionally positive and original feature of our study is that we 
obtain our other-rated measures of behavioral tendencies from 
raters who reported knowing the focal individual well, thus reducing 
the potential problem associated with naïve raters, i.e., the possibility 
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that fWHR would bias the judgment of naïve raters (e.g., Efferson & 
Vogt, 2013; Geniole, MacDonell, & McCormick, 2017). Taken 
together, we see our study’s use of a very large sample and other-
reported ratings from non-naïve raters as providing the foundation 
for a clearer assessment of whether fWHR predicts antisocial 
tendencies or whether it may be an example of an evolutionary 
mismatch.  
Furthermore, by relying on a sample of corporate leaders, our 
study also directly addresses the extent to which fWHR is relevant in 
predicting behavioral tendencies in the executive realm. If fWHR is 
indeed predictive of antisocial behavior among executives, this could 
have downstream consequences for firm strategy and outcomes.  
 
2.3    Sample and Methods 
 
2.3.1    Sample 
The source of our data is the Center for Creative Leadership’s 
(CCL) flagship executive development program. CCL is a non-profit 
organization headquartered in Greensboro, North Carolina that 
specializes in leadership training. The initial sample in this 
proprietary dataset consisted of 1,305 executives who participated in 
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a 360° feedback survey called the Campbell Leadership Index (CLI) 
from 2014 to 2017. Consistent with the 360° feedback approach, we 
were able to capture not only self-reported ratings, but also ratings 
from others who reported knowing the focal executives well 
(subordinates, peers, and supervisors). In terms of the self-reported 
data, the focal executives were surveyed at the start of the CCL 
leadership program. For the other-reported data, colleagues of the 
focal executives from the executives’ firms were surveyed 
anonymously prior to the start of the program.  
Our final sample, after accounting for missing pictures of the 
executives (n = 126) and averaging ratings within rater category for 
categories that included multiple raters per person (Atwater et al., 
2009), totaled 1,179 executives (873 males and 306 females), 
consisting of 1,179 self-, peer-, subordinate-, and superior-ratings. 
The inter-rater reliability is acceptable (α = 0.72 for peer-ratings, α = 
0.61 for subordinate-ratings, and α = 0.66 for superior-ratings). 
2.3.2    Estimating fWHR 
We ensured that the pictures of the executives that were 
collected were forward facing. Some of the facial images were 
slightly tilted to the right or left, which would have affected our fWHR 
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measurements. In order to correct for this, we rotated the pictures 
such that the eyes are on a horizontal plain. We then standardized 
the pictures to 8-bit gray scale images with a height of 400 pixels 
(Carré, McCormick, and Mondloch, 2009). Next, two research 
assistants independently measured the facial width (distance 
between the right and left zygion) and facial height (distance 
between the mid-brow and upper lip) of every executive using the 
NIH ImageJ software. FWHR was computed as facial width divided 
by facial height. Given that the reliability score was high (r = 0.90 for 
fWHR; r = 0.94 for both width and height), we averaged the scores 
between the two raters. We sought to further validate the results by 
measuring fWHR using the Facial Attributes function of Face++, an 
online artificial intelligence (AI) application (cf. Kosinski 2017) and 
found strong reliability between human raters and AI raters (0.81), 
giving us greater confidence in our fWHR measurements.  
In terms of descriptive statistics, the mean of human-rated fWHR for 
males is 1.81 (CI = 1.81 ± 0.008) and for females is 1.70 (CI = 1.7 ± 
0.013); whereas the mean of AI-rated fWHR for males is 1.90 (CI = 
1.9 ± 0.009) and for females is 1.85 (CI = 1.85 ± 0.0134). This 
indicates that fWHR is sexually dimorphic in our sample.  
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2.3.3    Behavioral measures 
From the 100 items in the CLI survey, we chose the 25 items 
that reflected anti/prosocial or (un)desirable behavioral tendencies. 
These 25 items and their descriptions are reported in the Appendix. 
To increase interpretability, we ran common factor analysis to extract 
latent variables from the 25 items. First, the common factor analysis 
indicated that there are only three factors with Eigenvalues more 
than 1. A number of items cross-loaded onto multiple factors. We 
dropped items with loadings that are less than 0.40 and obtained the 
most optimal model of the three factors. Based on prior research 
(Fiske et al., 2002; Goodwin, Piazza, and Rozin, 2013; Stavrova and 
Ehlebracht, 2016) we labeled these factors warmth (items: 
considerate, sensitive, affectionate, friendly, likeable, insensitive), 
cynicism (items: suspicious, cynical, temperamental, resentful, 
sarcastic), and morality (items: ethical, credible, candid, deceptive). 
The factor loadings are reported in Table 1 below. Table 2, which 
provides the correlations between self- and other-ratings on these 
three factors, shows that the correlation between different rater 
groups is low. This is consistent with our argument that self-reports 
and other reports are likely to differ. 
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2.4    Results 
 
Table 3 shows the correlations between fWHR and the three 
factors (i.e., cynicism, morality, and warmth). We found that both 
human-rated (p=0.037) and AI-rated (p=0.016) fWHR is positively 
related to self-rated cynicism, but not to other-rated cynicism, in 
males. Additionally, we found that AI-rated fWHR is negatively 
correlated with superior-rated cynicism in females (p=0.048). All 
other correlations are insignificant. Table 4 shows the partial 
correlations between fWHR and the three factors after controlling for 
age, race, and whether the target individual was smiling in the 
picture. After including these controls, only one significant 
relationship remains. Whereas human-rated fWHR is positively 
related to cynicism in males (p=0.048), the significance of the 
positive relationship between AI-rated fWHR and cynicism in males 
fell just below the p<0.05 threshold (p=0.052). However, when we 
apply a more conservative test that adjusts for multiple comparisons 
(p< 0.05 divided by 24 within-gender comparisons), we fail to find 
any significant bivariate or partial correlations (Table 5 and Table 6). 
Thus, our results—using self- and other-reported measures—shows 
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very little support for a link between fWHR and antisocial tendencies 
in males.   
To assess the robustness of our results, we conducted two 
additional analyses. First, we conducted subsample analyses to 
assess whether fWHR would be more strongly related to the three 
factors when examining only individuals who have extreme fWHR 
values (below -1 standard deviation and above 1 standard deviation, 
a sample of 361 executives). We found that none of the correlations 
are significant except that for males, human-rated fWHR (p=0.018) 
and AI-rated fWHR (p=0.004) are positively correlated with self-rated 
cynicism (Table 7). After adjusting for multiple comparisons like the 
analysis we conducted for our main results (Table 8), none of the 
results remained significant. Second, we examined the correlations 
between fWHR and each of the original 25 CLI items (SOM) and 
failed to find consistent patterns of significance (Table 9). As with our 
main results, all significant results disappeared once the findings 
were adjusted for multiple comparisons (Table 10).  
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2.5    Discussion 
 
We began by noting that while earlier research on the 
relevance of fWHR and antisocial tendencies suggested a positive 
relationship (e.g., Anderl et al., 2016; Carré & Mccormick, 2008; 
Goetz et al., 2013; Haselhun & Wong, 2011; Stirrat & Perett, 2010), 
Kosinski’s (2017) important study, which avoided some limitations of 
prior work, found little evidence supporting this relationship. In our 
study, we sought to advance this emerging debate by extending 
Kosinski (2017) and other work in several important ways. 
Specifically, we conducted a large-scale study on the relationship 
between fWHR and behavioral tendencies, but without the exclusive 
reliance on self-reported data (and its attendant social desirability 
bias). Our survey data was provided by focal individuals and by 
other non-naïve evaluators, i.e., they knew the focal individuals well.  
With this improved research design, we found, similar to Kosinski 
(2017), very little evidence supporting a presumed positive 
relationship between fWHR and antisocial tendencies.  
We interpret our finding as more consistent with the notion of 
an evolutionary mismatch, whereby fWHR, once reliably tied to 
antisocial tendencies in ancestral environments where violence was 
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far more pervasive, may no longer be predictive of these tendencies 
in modern environments, leading to biased perceptions (Li Van Vugt 
& Colarelli, 2017). Indeed, we suggest that the lack of a reliable link 
between fWHR and behavior does not necessarily mean that fWHR 
is unrelated to social judgments. Existing research has found that 
fWHR is positively related to a number of antisocial perceptions, 
including aggressiveness (Lefevre & Lewis, 2014), deceptiveness 
(Efferson & Vogt, 2013), proneness to anger (Deska, Lloyd, & 
Hugenberg, 2017), threat potential (Geniole et al., 2017), and 
ascriptions of inhumanity (Deska, Lloyd, & Hugenberg, 2018). We 
welcome future research that further refines our understanding of 
how and why physical characteristics, such as fWHR, may 
differentially affect focal-actor behaviors versus social perceptions. 
Such an endeavor will increase our understanding of not only our 
evolved psyche, but also why immutable physical characteristics 
may shape social outcomes, even when they are not predictive of 
behavior.  
Finally, our findings also contribute to corporate leadership 
research by suggesting that formidability signals (such as fWHR) are 
unlikely to be predictive of executive behavior. Our results suggest 
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that if formidability signals do indeed affect corporate outcomes, this 
will likely be due to the biasing effect of formidability signals on 
observer judgments, rather than through a direct link between an 
individual’s fWHR and his or her behavior.  
2.6    Limitations 
 
While our findings appear robust, we also want to 
acknowledge two caveats. First, our results could be affected by the 
ceiling and reference-group effects because the business executives 
in our sample may differ systematically on both fWHR (Alrajih and 
Ward, 2014) and antisocial tendencies (Babiak, Neumann, and 
Hare, 2010) compared to the general population. Although the mean 
fWHR for males and females in our sample is similar to the general 
population (e.g., Alrajih and Ward, 2014; Kosinski, 2017), we cannot 
rule out the possibility that the executives in our sample are more 
antisocial (Babiak, Neumann, and Hare, 2010). This is a limitation 
with regard to generalizing our findings to the general population but 
utilizing an executive sample has allowed us to more definitively 
address whether the link between fWHR and behavior holds for 
corporate leaders. Second, since our data was collected in the 
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context of occupational training, it is possible that respondents could 
have been hesitant to portray their colleagues in a negative light. 
While we cannot entirely rule out this possibility, the leadership 
training program attempted to reduce this bias by making the ratings 
completely anonymous, and by making it clear to the raters that only 
scores aggregated across all raters will be disclosed to individual 
participants. We welcome future research that extends our work to 
consider these issues.    
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2.7    Tables 
2.7.1    Table 1. Common factor analysis of selected Campbell 
leadership items with uniqueness score and variance explained 
 
Variable Warmt
h 
Cynicis
m 
Moralit
y 
Unique
-ness 
Sensitive (Highly aware of the feelings of others) 0.756   0.339 
Considerate (Thoughtful of the needs and 
feelings of others) 0.754   0.292 
Affectionate (Acts close, warm, and caring 
toward others) 0.727   0.424 
Friendly (Warm and pleasant, nice to be around) 0.710   0.265 
Likeable (Easy to feel friendly toward) 0.669   0.298 
Insensitive (Unaware of the feelings of others) -0.645   0.393 
Suspicious (Inclined to distrust others)  0.630  0.441 
Temperamental (Moody, irritable, and overly 
sensitive)  0.603  0.493 
Cynical (Doubts the goodness of others)  0.597  0.494 
Resentful (Feels injured, insulted, or exploited)  0.580  0.559 
Sarcastic (Makes cutting remarks belittling 
others)  0.570  0.517 
Credible (Worthy of trust, believable)   0.679 0.372 
Candid (Open and honest when dealing with 
others)   0.560 0.539 
Ethical (Lives within society's standards of right 
and wrong)   0.519 0.632 
Deceptive (Conceals the truth for selfish 
reasons)   -0.560 0.493 
Percentage of Variance Explained  50.87% 31.53% 24.23%  
Note. Only factor loadings above 0.40 are reported. Items were rotated using Varimax 
rotation. 
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2.7.2    Table 2. Correlations between self, peer, subordinate 
and superior reported scores on the three Campbell Leadership 
Index factors (N=1,179) 
 
 Peer Self Sub 
  95% CI   95% CI   95% CI 
 r p 
Lo
wer 
Up
per 
r P 
Lo
wer 
Up
per 
r p 
Lo
wer 
Up
per 
C
y
n
ic
is
m
 
Pe
er 
- - - -         
Se
lf 
0.2
84 
0.000
*** 
0.2
31 
0.3
36 
- - - -     
Su
b 
0.4
04 
0.000
*** 
0.3
55 
0.4
51 
0.2
64 
0.000
*** 
0.2
10 
0.3
16 
- - - - 
Su
p 
0.3
70 
0.000
*** 
0.3
19 
0.4
18 
0.1
88 
0.000
*** 
0.1
33 
0.2
43 
0.2
79 
0.000
*** 
0.2
26 
0.3
31 
M
o
ra
li
ty
 
Pe
er 
- - - -         
Se
lf 
0.1
31 
0.000
*** 
0.0
74 
0.1
87 
- - - -     
Su
b 
0.3
24 
0.000
*** 
0.2
72 
0.3
74 
0.1
97 
0.000
*** 
0.1
41 
0.2
51 
- - - - 
Su
p 
0.3
03 
0.000
*** 
0.2
50 
0.3
54 
0.1
23 
0.000
*** 
0.0
66 
0.1
79 
0.2
53 
0.000
*** 
0.1
99 
0.3
06 
W
a
rm
th
 
Pe
er 
- - - -         
Se
lf 
0.4
24 
0.000
*** 
0.3
76 
0.4
70 
- - - -     
Su
b 
0.4
94 
0.000
*** 
0.4
49 
0.5
36 
0.3
74 
0.000
*** 
0.3
24 
0.4
22 
- - - - 
Su
p 
0.4
65 
0.000
*** 
0.4
19 
0.5
08 
0.3
79 
0.000
*** 
0.3
29 
0.4
27 
0.4
01 
0.000
*** 
0.3
52 
0.4
48 
Note. * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, *** for p<0.001 
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2.7.3    Table 3. Correlation between FWHR and CLI factors  
 
fWHR Rater 
(Human) 
Male (N = 873) Female (N = 306) 
 
  95% CI  95% CI   
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism Peer 
0.029 0.386 
-
0.037 0.096 0.025 0.659 
-
0.087 0.137 
Self 
0.071 
0.037
* 0.004 0.136 
-
0.046 0.426 
-
0.157 0.067 
Sub -
0.008 0.807 
-
0.075 0.058 
-
0.073 0.202 
-
0.184 0.039 
Sup 
0.018 0.602 
-
0.049 0.084 
-
0.029 0.612 
-
0.141 0.083 
Morality Peer -
0.018 0.594 
-
0.084 0.048 0.032 0.575 -0.08 0.144 
Self -
0.002 0.947 
-
0.069 0.064 
-
0.011 0.851 
-
0.123 0.101 
Sub 
0.03 0.378 
-
0.037 0.096 
-
0.028 0.624 -0.14 0.084 
Sup 
0.047 0.162 
-
0.019 0.113 0.05 0.386 
-
0.063 0.161 
Warmth Peer 
-0.01 0.763 
-
0.077 0.056 0.025 0.662 
-
0.087 0.137 
Self 
0.01 0.776 
-
0.057 0.076 0.037 0.524 
-
0.076 0.148 
Sub 
0.01 0.76 
-
0.056 0.077 0.034 0.554 
-
0.078 0.146 
Sup 
0.021 0.528 
-
0.045 0.088 
-
0.014 0.809 
-
0.126 0.098 
 
fWHR Rater (AI) 
Male (N = 873) Female (N = 306) 
  95% CI  95% CI   
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism Peer -
0.023 0.505 
-
0.089 0.044 -0.01 0.867 
-
0.122 0.103 
Self 
0.081 
0.016
* 0.015 0.147 
-
0.004 0.94 
-
0.116 0.108 
Sub -
0.035 0.305 
-
0.101 0.032 
-
0.083 0.148 
-
0.193 0.03 
Sup -
0.013 0.711 
-
0.079 0.054 
-
0.113 
0.048
* 
-
0.223 
-
0.001 
Morality Peer 0.037 0.271 - 0.103 0.001 0.992 - 0.113 
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0.029 0.112 
Self 
0.021 0.544 
-
0.046 0.087 0.058 0.315 
-
0.055 0.169 
Sub 
0.012 0.723 
-
0.054 0.078 0.03 0.604 
-
0.083 0.141 
Sup 
0.055 0.103 
-
0.011 0.121 0.064 0.267 
-
0.049 0.175 
Warmth Peer 
0.031 0.362 
-
0.036 0.097 0.052 0.367 
-
0.061 0.163 
Self 
0.003 0.919 
-
0.063 0.07 0.063 0.274 -0.05 0.174 
Sub -
0.004 0.909 -0.07 0.062 0.102 0.073 -0.01 0.212 
Sup 
0.044 0.192 
-
0.022 0.11 0.089 0.122 
-
0.024 0.199 
Note. * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, *** for p<0.001 
 
 
2.7.4    Table 4. Partial correlations between fWHR and CLI 
factors with controls  
 
fWHR Rater 
(Human) 
Male (N = 873) Female (N = 306) 
 
  95% CI  95% CI   
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism Peer 
0.046 0.176 
-
0.021 0.112 0.030 0.603 
-
0.083 0.142 
Self 
0.067 
0.048
* 0.001 0.133 
-
0.036 0.530 
-
0.148 0.076 
Sub 
0.001 0.974 
-
0.065 0.067 
-
0.076 0.186 
-
0.186 0.037 
Sup 
0.029 0.398 
-
0.038 0.095 
-
0.021 0.711 
-
0.133 0.091 
Morality Peer -
0.034 0.321 
-
0.100 0.033 0.020 0.731 
-
0.093 0.132 
Self -
0.010 0.774 
-
0.076 0.057 
-
0.019 0.738 
-
0.131 0.093 
Sub 
0.028 0.408 
-
0.038 0.094 
-
0.031 0.594 
-
0.142 0.082 
Sup 
0.033 0.330 
-
0.033 0.099 0.045 0.435 
-
0.068 0.156 
Warmth Peer -
0.020 0.563 
-
0.086 0.047 0.033 0.568 
-
0.080 0.144 
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Self 
0.009 0.788 
-
0.057 0.075 0.039 0.496 
-
0.073 0.150 
Sub 
0.010 0.769 
-
0.056 0.076 0.036 0.535 
-
0.077 0.147 
Sup 
0.018 0.596 
-
0.048 0.084 
-
0.012 0.832 
-
0.124 0.100 
 
fWHR Rater (AI) 
Male (N = 873) Female (N = 306) 
  95% CI  95% CI   
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism Peer -
0.001 0.984 
-
0.067 0.066 0.022 0.705 
-
0.091 0.134 
Self 
0.066 0.052 
-
0.001 0.132 0.005 0.925 
-
0.107 0.117 
Sub -
0.030 0.374 
-
0.096 0.036 
-
0.083 0.147 
-
0.193 0.029 
Sup 
0.004 0.897 
-
0.062 0.071 
-
0.092 0.109 
-
0.202 0.020 
Morality Peer 
0.027 0.418 
-
0.039 0.094 
-
0.011 0.842 
-
0.123 0.101 
Self 
0.014 0.682 
-
0.053 0.080 0.064 0.265 
-
0.049 0.175 
Sub 
0.023 0.501 
-
0.044 0.089 0.025 0.669 
-
0.088 0.136 
Sup 
0.038 0.258 
-
0.028 0.104 0.043 0.449 
-
0.069 0.155 
Warmth Peer 
0.017 0.618 
-
0.050 0.083 0.062 0.283 
-
0.051 0.172 
Self 
0.001 0.984 
-
0.066 0.067 0.057 0.323 
-
0.056 0.168 
Sub -
0.006 0.852 
-
0.073 0.060 0.096 0.095 
-
0.017 0.206 
Sup 
0.039 0.252 
-
0.028 0.105 0.081 0.156 
-
0.031 0.192 
Note. * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, *** for p<0.001; fWHR and CLI factors are obtained by 
regressing facial expression, age and race and then getting the residuals.  
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2.7.5    Table 5. Correlation between fWHR and CLI factors by 
fWHR-rater, gender and CLI-rater adjusting for multiple 
comparison 
fWHR Rater 
(Human) 
Male (N = 873) Female (N = 306) 
 95% CI  95% CI 
r p 
Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
r p 
Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism 
Peer 0.029 0.386 
-
0.037 
0.096 0.025 0.659 
-
0.087 
0.137 
Self 0.071 0.037 0.004 0.136 
-
0.046 
0.426 
-
0.157 
0.067 
Sub 
-
0.008 
0.807 
-
0.075 
0.058 
-
0.073 
0.202 
-
0.184 
0.039 
Sup 0.018 0.602 
-
0.049 
0.084 
-
0.029 
0.612 
-
0.141 
0.083 
Morality 
Peer 
-
0.018 
0.594 
-
0.084 
0.048 0.032 0.575 
-
0.080 
0.144 
Self 
-
0.002 
0.947 
-
0.069 
0.064 
-
0.011 
0.851 
-
0.123 
0.101 
Sub 0.030 0.378 
-
0.037 
0.096 
-
0.028 
0.624 
-
0.140 
0.084 
Sup 0.047 0.162 
-
0.019 
0.113 0.050 0.386 
-
0.063 
0.161 
Warmth 
Peer -0.01 0.763 
-
0.077 
0.056 0.025 0.662 
-
0.087 
0.137 
Self 0.010 0.776 
-
0.057 
0.076 0.037 0.524 
-
0.076 
0.148 
Sub 0.010 0.760 
-
0.056 
0.077 0.034 0.554 
-
0.078 
0.146 
Sup 0.021 0.528 
-
0.045 
0.088 
-
0.014 
0.809 
-
0.126 
0.098 
          
fWHR Rater (AI) 
Male (N = 873) Female (N = 306) 
 95% CI  95% CI 
r p 
Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
r p 
Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism 
Peer 
-
0.023 
0.505 
-
0.089 
0.044 
-
0.010 
0.867 
-
0.122 
0.103 
Self 0.081 0.016 0.015 0.147 
-
0.004 
0.940 
-
0.116 
0.108 
Sub 
-
0.035 
0.305 
-
0.101 
0.032 
-
0.083 
0.148 
-
0.193 
0.030 
Sup 
-
0.013 
0.711 
-
0.079 
0.054 
-
0.113 
0.048 
-
0.223 
-
0.001 
Morality Peer 0.037 0.271 - 0.103 0.001 0.992 - 0.113 
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0.029 0.112 
Self 0.021 0.544 
-
0.046 
0.087 0.058 0.315 
-
0.055 
0.169 
Sub 0.012 0.723 
-
0.054 
0.078 0.030 0.604 
-
0.083 
0.141 
Sup 0.055 0.103 
-
0.011 
0.121 0.064 0.267 
-
0.049 
0.175 
Warmth 
Peer 0.031 0.362 
-
0.036 
0.097 0.052 0.367 
-
0.061 
0.163 
Self 0.003 0.919 
-
0.063 
0.070 0.063 0.274 
-
0.050 
0.174 
Sub 
-
0.004 
0.909 
-
0.070 
0.062 0.102 0.073 
-
0.010 
0.212 
Sup 0.044 0.192 
-
0.022 
0.110 0.089 0.122 
-
0.024 
0.199 
Note. Correlations significant at the p < 0.002 level (0.05/24) are given * since the p-values 
were adjusted for multiple comparisons. For the correlations table unadjusted for multiple 
comparisons, refer to Table 3 in manuscript. 
 
 
2.7.6    Table 6. Partial correlation between fWHR and CLI 
factors by fWHR rater, gender and CLI-rater controlling for 
smiling, age and race adjusted for multiple comparison  
 
fWHR Rater 
(Human) 
Male (N = 873) Female (N = 306) 
 95% CI  95% CI 
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism Peer-
rated 0.046 0.176 
-
0.021 0.112 0.030 0.603 
-
0.083 0.142 
Self-
rated 0.067 0.048 0.001 0.133 
-
0.036 0.530 
-
0.148 0.076 
Sub-
rated 0.001 0.974 
-
0.065 0.067 
-
0.076 0.186 
-
0.186 0.037 
Sup-
rated 0.029 0.398 
-
0.038 0.095 
-
0.021 0.711 
-
0.133 0.091 
Morality Peer-
rated 
-
0.034 0.321 
-
0.100 0.033 0.020 0.731 
-
0.093 0.132 
Self-
rated 
-
0.010 0.774 
-
0.076 0.057 
-
0.019 0.738 
-
0.131 0.093 
Sub-
rated 0.028 0.408 
-
0.038 0.094 
-
0.031 0.594 
-
0.142 0.082 
Sup-
rated 0.033 0.330 
-
0.033 0.099 0.045 0.435 
-
0.068 0.156 
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Warmth Peer-
rated 
-
0.020 0.563 
-
0.086 0.047 0.033 0.568 
-
0.080 0.144 
Self-
rated 0.009 0.788 
-
0.057 0.075 0.039 0.496 
-
0.073 0.150 
Sub-
rated 0.010 0.769 
-
0.056 0.076 0.036 0.535 
-
0.077 0.147 
Sup-
rated 0.018 0.596 
-
0.048 0.084 
-
0.012 0.832 
-
0.124 0.100 
          
fWHR Rater (AI) 
Male (N = 873) Female (N = 306) 
 95% CI  95% CI 
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
r p Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism Peer-
rated 
-
0.001 0.984 
-
0.067 0.066 0.022 0.705 
-
0.091 0.134 
Self-
rated 0.066 0.052 
-
0.001 0.132 0.005 0.925 
-
0.107 0.117 
Sub-
rated 
-
0.030 0.374 
-
0.096 0.036 
-
0.083 0.147 
-
0.193 0.029 
Sup-
rated 0.004 0.897 
-
0.062 0.071 
-
0.092 0.109 
-
0.202 0.020 
Morality Peer-
rated 0.027 0.418 
-
0.039 0.094 
-
0.011 0.842 
-
0.123 0.101 
Self-
rated 0.014 0.682 
-
0.053 0.080 0.064 0.265 
-
0.049 0.175 
Sub-
rated 0.023 0.501 
-
0.044 0.089 0.025 0.669 
-
0.088 0.136 
Sup-
rated 0.038 0.258 
-
0.028 0.104 0.043 0.449 
-
0.069 0.155 
Warmth Peer-
rated 0.017 0.618 
-
0.050 0.083 0.062 0.283 
-
0.051 0.172 
Self-
rated 0.001 0.984 
-
0.066 0.067 0.057 0.323 
-
0.056 0.168 
Sub-
rated 
-
0.006 0.852 
-
0.073 0.060 0.096 0.095 
-
0.017 0.206 
Sup-
rated 0.039 0.252 
-
0.028 0.105 0.081 0.156 
-
0.031 0.192 
Note. Partial correlations significant at the p < 0.002 level (0.05/24) are given * since the 
p-values were adjusted for multiple comparisons. For the table unadjusted for multiple 
comparisons, refer to Table 4 in manuscript. 
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2.7.7    Table 7. Correlation between fWHR and CLI factors by 
fWHR-rater, gender, and CLI-rater for people with high (+1 SD) 
vs. low (-1 SD) fWHR not adjusting for multiple comparison.  
fWHR Rater 
(Human) 
Male (N = 277) Female (N = 98) 
 95% CI  95% CI 
r p 
Low
er 
Uppe
r 
r p 
Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism 
Peer 
0.052 0.390 
-
0.06
6 0.169 
-
0.072 0.481 
-
0.267 0.128 
Self 
0.142 
0.018
* 
0.02
5 0.256 
-
0.164 0.107 
-
0.351 0.036 
Sub 
0.010 0.870 
-
0.10
8 0.128 
-
0.192 0.058 
-
0.376 0.006 
Sup 
0.062 0.306 
-
0.05
7 0.178 
-
0.097 0.342 
-
0.290 0.103 
Morality 
Peer 
0.005 0.935 
-
0.11
3 0.123 0.034 0.737 
-
0.165 0.231 
Self -
0.036 0.548 
-
0.15
3 0.082 
-
0.035 0.733 
-
0.232 0.165 
Sub 
0.008 0.890 
-
0.11
0 0.126 0.002 0.987 
-
0.197 0.200 
Sup 
0.043 0.473 
-
0.07
5 0.160 0.155 0.127 
-
0.045 0.343 
Warmth 
Peer -
0.045 0.453 
-
0.16
2 0.073 
-
0.046 0.650 
-
0.243 0.153 
Self -
0.001 0.990 
-
0.11
9 0.117 0.087 0.392 
-
0.113 0.281 
Sub -
0.009 0.881 
-
0.12
7 0.109 0.090 0.379 
-
0.111 0.283 
Sup 
0.065 0.279 
-
0.05
3 0.182 
-
0.052 0.611 
-
0.248 0.148 
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fWHR Rater (AI) 
Male (N = 277) Female (N = 98) 
 95% CI  95% CI 
r p 
Low
er 
Uppe
r 
r p 
Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism 
Peer 
0.017 0.780 
-
0.10
1 0.134 
-
0.008 0.934 
-
0.206 0.190 
Self 
0.172 
0.004
** 
0.05
5 0.284 
-
0.025 0.807 
-
0.222 0.174 
Sub 
0.020 0.741 
-
0.09
8 0.137 
-
0.148 0.146 
-
0.336 0.052 
Sup 
0.075 0.212 
-
0.04
3 0.191 
-
0.143 0.159 
-
0.332 0.057 
Morality 
Peer 
0.037 0.535 
-
0.08
1 0.155 0.006 0.951 
-
0.192 0.204 
Self -
0.029 0.635 
-
0.14
6 0.090 
-
0.008 0.939 
-
0.206 0.191 
Sub 
0.026 0.670 
-
0.09
2 0.143 0.001 0.989 
-
0.197 0.200 
Sup 
0.059 0.330 
-
0.06
0 0.175 0.119 0.242 
-
0.081 0.310 
Warmth 
Peer 
0.013 0.831 
-
0.10
5 0.131 
-
0.044 0.665 
-
0.241 0.155 
Self 
0.003 0.962 
-
0.11
5 0.121 0.094 0.359 
-
0.107 0.287 
Sub -
0.003 0.954 
-
0.12
1 0.114 0.113 0.269 
-
0.088 0.304 
Sup 
0.109 0.070 
-
0.00
9 0.224 
-
0.073 0.476 
-
0.267 0.127 
Note. * for p<0.05, ** for p<0.01, *** for p<0.001 
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2.7.8    Table 8. Correlation between fWHR and CLI factors by 
fWHR-rater, gender, and CLI-rater for people with high (+1 SD) 
vs. low (-1 SD) fWHR adjusting for multiple comparison.  
fWHR Rater 
(Human) 
Male (N = 277) Female (N = 98) 
 95% CI  95% CI 
r p 
Low
er 
Uppe
r 
r p 
Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism 
Peer 
0.052 0.390 
-
0.06
6 0.169 
-
0.072 0.481 
-
0.267 0.128 
Self 
0.142 0.018 
0.02
5 0.256 
-
0.164 0.107 
-
0.351 0.036 
Sub 
0.010 0.870 
-
0.10
8 0.128 
-
0.192 0.058 
-
0.376 0.006 
Sup 
0.062 0.306 
-
0.05
7 0.178 
-
0.097 0.342 
-
0.290 0.103 
Morality 
Peer 
0.005 0.935 
-
0.11
3 0.123 0.034 0.737 
-
0.165 0.231 
Self -
0.036 0.548 
-
0.15
3 0.082 
-
0.035 0.733 
-
0.232 0.165 
Sub 
0.008 0.890 
-
0.11
0 0.126 0.002 0.987 
-
0.197 0.200 
Sup 
0.043 0.473 
-
0.07
5 0.160 0.155 0.127 
-
0.045 0.343 
Warmth 
Peer -
0.045 0.453 
-
0.16
2 0.073 
-
0.046 0.650 
-
0.243 0.153 
Self -
0.001 0.990 
-
0.11
9 0.117 0.087 0.392 
-
0.113 0.281 
Sub -
0.009 0.881 
-
0.12
7 0.109 0.090 0.379 
-
0.111 0.283 
Sup 
0.065 0.279 
-
0.05
3 0.182 
-
0.052 0.611 
-
0.248 0.148 
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fWHR Rater (AI) 
Male (N = 277) Female (N = 98) 
 95% CI  95% CI 
r p 
Low
er 
Uppe
r 
r p 
Lowe
r 
Uppe
r 
Cynicism 
Peer 
0.017 0.780 
-
0.10
1 0.134 
-
0.008 0.934 
-
0.206 0.190 
Self 
0.172 0.004 
0.05
5 0.284 
-
0.025 0.807 
-
0.222 0.174 
Sub 
0.020 0.741 
-
0.09
8 0.137 
-
0.148 0.146 
-
0.336 0.052 
Sup 
0.075 0.212 
-
0.04
3 0.191 
-
0.143 0.159 
-
0.332 0.057 
Morality 
Peer 
0.037 0.535 
-
0.08
1 0.155 0.006 0.951 
-
0.192 0.204 
Self -
0.029 0.635 
-
0.14
6 0.090 
-
0.008 0.939 
-
0.206 0.191 
Sub 
0.026 0.670 
-
0.09
2 0.143 0.001 0.989 
-
0.197 0.200 
Sup 
0.059 0.330 
-
0.06
0 0.175 0.119 0.242 
-
0.081 0.310 
Warmth 
Peer 
0.013 0.831 
-
0.10
5 0.131 
-
0.044 0.665 
-
0.241 0.155 
Self 
0.003 0.962 
-
0.11
5 0.121 0.094 0.359 
-
0.107 0.287 
Sub -
0.003 0.954 
-
0.12
1 0.114 0.113 0.269 
-
0.088 0.304 
Sup 
0.109 0.070 
-
0.00
9 0.224 
-
0.073 0.476 
-
0.267 0.127 
Note. Partial correlations significant at the p < 0.002 level (0.05/24) are given * since the 
p-values were adjusted for multiple comparisons. 
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Chapter 3. It’s Not What You Say, but How You 
Sound: The Effect of CEO Vocal Masculinity on 
CEO Compensation Decisions Made by the 
Board  
 
ABSTRACT 
Growing research in evolutionary psychology suggests that having a 
deep, masculine voice provides benefits to individuals in leadership 
positions. However, how these effects play out at the top of 
organizations is not clearly understood. In this study, we examine 
how CEO vocal masculinity—the perceived deepness of the CEO’s 
voice—shapes board decisions on CEO compensation. We argue 
that CEO vocal masculinity influences CEO compensation through 
two channels—shaping director’s perceptions of CEO quality, and 
their perceptions of the CEO’s willingness to retaliate against critical 
directors. We identify these mechanisms by examining two 
moderating conditions—industry competitiveness, and CEO power—
where each of these biases is especially strong. We also argue 
female representation on the compensation committee weakens the 
effect of both mechanisms. Longitudinal analyses on a unique data 
 42 
set consisting of CEO interviews and speeches from publicly listed 
UK firms from 2004 to 2013 provides support for our predictions. 
 
3.1    Introduction 
 
“It is not what you say that matters but the manner in which you say 
it; there lies the secret of the ages.” - William Carlos Williams 
Boards of directors are instrumental in monitoring, motivating, 
and ultimately compensating CEOs for their contributions to the 
firm’s success. Although these tasks require the careful analysis of 
information about the CEO, boards are often susceptible to the 
influence of cognitive biases. Existing research has found that CEO 
compensation is driven not only by economic determinants, but also 
by biases such as in-group favoritism (Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zhu 
& Westphal, 2014), group polarization (Zhu, 2014), and social 
comparison bias (O’Reilly, Main, & Crystal, 1988). 
Some biases that influence boards may have deep 
evolutionary origins. Vocal masculinity—the perceived deepness or 
lowness of an individual’s voice, is a biological signal of formidability 
(i.e., fighting ability) that evolved due to the pervasiveness of violent 
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conflicts over the course of human evolutionary history (Puts, Doll, 
and Hill, 2014). Since formidability was important ancestrally, both in 
predicting an individual’s quality as a leader, and an individual’s 
willingness to retaliate in conflicts, there are evolved biases that 
associate vocal masculinity with both of these attributes (Cheng & 
Tracy, 2014; Puts et al., 2014). Growing research in evolutionary 
psychology under controlled experimental conditions provides 
support for this notion (Klofstad, Anderson, & Peters, 2012; Puts, 
Gaulin, & Verdolini, 2006; Tigue et al., 2012). 
The benefits of having a deep voice for business executives 
have begun to receive the attention of practitioners and the business 
press (Economist, 2014; Goman, 2013; Shellenbarger, 2013). 
However, there is very little scholarly research that examines these 
benefits (for an exception, see Mayew, Parsons, and Venkatachlam, 
2013). More importantly, the lack of attention to boundary conditions 
that moderate these effects has fueled a deterministic view of these 
biases. For example, a recent Economist (2014) article that 
discussed the benefits of possessing vocal masculinity and other 
formidability signals in the corporate elite, failed to propose 
conditions that can strengthen or mitigate the effect of these biases, 
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and concluded that “we just accept that stereotypes and prejudices 
cannot be wished away”.  
This misunderstanding is a manifestation of the widely-held 
view, common even among scholars (Confer et al., 2010; Markóczy 
& Goldberg, 1998; Winegard, Winegard, & Deaner, 2014), that if 
something is evolutionary in nature, then it is impervious to change 
(Buss, 2014: p. 16-17). This line of reasoning is referred to as the 
deterministic fallacy. Contrary to this perspective, research in 
evolutionary psychology indicates that evolved biases are context-
dependent, and that there are systematic differences between 
individuals in their propensity towards specific evolved biases (Buss, 
2014: p. 16-17; Haselton, Nettle, & Murray, 2015; Neuberg, Kenrick, 
& Schaller, 2010).  
In this article, we examine the effect of CEO vocal masculinity 
on the board’s decision on CEO compensation, and the boundary 
conditions that characterize this relationship. Vocal masculinity is 
likely to be particularly important to how boards perceive the CEO 
because of how often directors are exposed to it. Whether directors 
are calling the CEO on the phone, meeting the CEO face to face, or 
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attending company meetings via conference calls, CEO vocal 
masculinity is observable to directors. 
We argue that CEO vocal masculinity influences CEO 
compensation through two separate mechanisms—shaping 
directors’ perceptions of CEO quality, and their perceptions of the 
CEO’s willingness to retaliate against directors critical of CEO 
compensation. We identify these mechanisms by examining two 
moderating conditions—industry competitiveness, and CEO power—
where each of these biases is especially strong. We also argue that 
female representation on the compensation committee weakens the 
effect of CEO vocal masculinity on CEO compensation by mitigating 
the effect of both the CEO quality bias, and the CEO threat bias. 
Longitudinal analyses on a data set consisting of CEO interviews 
and speeches from UK firms listed on the FTSE 100 from 2004 to 
2013 provide support for our hypotheses. 
Our study adds to the corporate governance literature by 
introducing a novel evolutionary psychology approach to examine 
the effect of CEO vocal masculinity on CEO compensation. By 
examining the role of industry competitiveness, CEO power, and 
female representation on the compensation committee, in 
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moderating the positive effect of CEO vocal masculinity on CEO 
compensation, our research contributes to a non-deterministic 
account of how vocal masculinity influence outcomes in the 
governance context.  
Our research is also notable for studying the association 
directors perceive between CEO vocal masculinity and the CEO’s 
willingness to retaliate as a mechanism by which CEO vocal 
masculinity influences CEO compensation. Although scholars have 
argued that past threatening actions by the CEO, and the CEO’s 
objective ability to retaliate, are important in shaping formal 
evaluations of the CEO by stakeholders such as financial analysts 
(Westphal & Clement, 2008) and journalists (Westphal & 
Deephouse, 2011), existing research has not examined how 
seemingly trivial factors—such as CEO vocal masculinity—could 
also play a similar role.  
By examining the effect of female representation on the 
compensation committee in weakening the CEO vocal masculinity-
CEO compensation relationship, we also contribute to an important 
debate in the gender diversity literature. Some scholars have argued 
that the increasing representation of female directors on boards will 
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have an effect on board decision-making (Chen, Crossland, & 
Huang, 2016; Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Levi, Li, & Zhang, 2014). 
Others have argued that since the type of males and females who 
rise to the top of the corporate leadership rank are different from 
their counterparts in the general population and more similar to each 
other, gender differences are unlikely to play an important role 
(Adams & Ragunathan, 2013; Bertrand & Hollock, 2001; Economist, 
2015). Our arguments built on evolutionary reasoning support the 
perspective that gender differences are important in shaping board 
outcomes. 
3.2    Theory and Hypotheses 
 
Directors face two major challenges during the CEO compensation-
setting process. First, the evaluation of CEO quality is often 
challenging. Although firm performance is the most widely used 
gage of CEO quality (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; 
Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985), it is difficult to determine whether 
firm performance is driven by the CEO’s actions or by factors largely 
outside the CEO’s control. These factors may include decisions 
made by the previous CEO (Graffin, Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013), 
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fluctuations in the industry environment (Holmstrom, 1982), and 
contributions of other top managers (Boeker, 1992).  
Second, directors may be hesitant to criticize CEO 
compensation because of the potential for retaliation from the CEO. 
In spite of the board’s legal authority over the CEO, CEOs often hold 
great power over boards, influencing director reappointment 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zhu & Westphal, 2014), director 
compensation (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Fiss, 2006), and the 
likelihood of directors attaining external board positions (Westphal & 
Stern, 2006; Westphal & Stern, 2007). Since CEO compensation is a 
source of material wealth and social status for the CEO (DiPrete, 
Eirich, and Pittinsky, 2010; Kim, Kogut, and Yang, 2015), CEOs may 
retaliate against directors who question CEO compensation 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Hill and Phan, 1991).  
Due to the challenges associated with evaluating CEO quality 
and assessing potential threat from the CEO, directors are especially 
susceptible to the influence of biases during the CEO compensation-
setting process (Boivie, 2016). We will now examine how CEO vocal 
masculinity influences CEO compensation by shaping both directors’ 
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perceptions of CEO quality, and their perceptions of the CEO’s 
willingness to retaliate against critical directors.  
3.2.1    Vocal masculinity 
Evolutionary scientists have argued that due to the pervasive nature 
of violence over valued resources across evolutionary history 
(Manson and Wrangham, 1991; Puts, Bailey, and Philip, 2015), 
humans evolved the ability to assess the formidability of others on 
the basis of physiological signals (Petersen, 2015; Sell et al., 2009a; 
Sell et al., 2010). This ability provided humans with a survival and 
reproductive advantage by inducing individuals to engage in conflicts 
when the probability of success was relatively high, and to yield 
when the probability of failure was relatively high (Hammerstein and 
Parker, 1982; Petersen et al., 2013; Sell, Tooby and Cosmides, 
2009b). Among the most important formidability signals is vocal 
masculinity (Puts et al., 2014; Sell et al., 2010). 
Vocal masculinity provides information about formidability that 
is not easily deduced from visual cues in the body and the face (Sell 
et al., 2010). Furthermore, listeners across cultures can quickly and 
accurately assess the formidability of male speakers by listening to 
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only their voices, even when the speakers are speaking in a 
language that is unfamiliar to them (Sell et al., 2010). 
3.2.2    Vocal masculinity, leadership quality, and willingness to 
retaliate  
Formidability was important ancestrally in predicting both leadership 
quality and willingness to retaliate in conflicts. Thus, there are 
evolved biases that prompt listeners to link vocal masculinity with 
these traits. These biases are highly automated (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999) and operate largely beyond the realm of conscious experience 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; Klofstad, Nowicki, & 
Anderson, 2016). 
Due to the pervasiveness of violence in ancestral 
environments, it was beneficial to follow a formidable leader. 
Following a formidable leader provided a survival and reproductive 
advantage to individuals by discouraging challengers from 
approaching and increasing the probability of prevailing in conflicts. 
As a result, humans evolved a preference for leaders who display 
physiological characteristics that signal formidability, such as vocal 
masculinity (Murray, 2014; Van Vugt & Ronay, 2014). Consistent 
with this notion, experimental research in political psychology has 
found that individuals prefer leaders with deeper voices (Klofstad et 
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al., 2012; Tigue et al., 2012). The idea that formidability signals bias 
perceptions of leadership quality is also supported by studies 
examining the effect of other formidability signals such as facial 
masculinity (Spisak et al., 2012), musculature (Blaker & Van Vugt, 
2014), and height (Blaker et al., 2013) on voter preferences. 
Physical violence was the last resort for unresolved conflicts 
over evolutionary history (Barkow, 2014). Since individuals higher on 
formidability were more likely to prevail in conflicts, they also evolved 
a greater willingness to retaliate when their access to important 
resources were challenged (Petersen et al., 2013; Sell et al., 2009b). 
Consistent with this notion, existing research has found that more 
formidable individuals are more likely to espouse aggressive policies 
against enemies (Sell et al., 2009b; Sell et al., 2012), to become 
angry when negotiating with others (Sell et al., 2009b), and to be 
self-interested with regard to material wealth (Petersen et al., 2013). 
Given the recurrent nature of these patterns, listeners are influenced 
by vocal masculinity when assessing an individual’s willingness to 
retaliate in conflicts (Laustsen, Peterson, & Klofstad, 2015). 
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3.2.3    CEO vocal masculinity and CEO compensation 
We contend that CEO vocal masculinity will positively influence CEO 
compensation through two mechanisms: shaping directors’ 
evaluations of CEO quality, and their assessment of the CEO’s 
willingness to retaliate in response to criticism of CEO 
compensation. First, since evaluating CEO quality is difficult, 
directors are especially susceptible to evolved biases that associate 
deeper voices with CEO quality. Given their positive views of the 
quality of CEOs high on vocal masculinity, directors will support 
higher compensation for these CEOs. 
Second, since CEO compensation is important to the CEO, 
providing the CEO with not only material wealth but also social 
status (DiPrete et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2015), biases that associate 
vocal masculinity with willingness to retaliate in conflicts will 
influence directors’ decisions on whether to criticize CEO 
compensation. CEOs often have influence over director 
reappointment and the likelihood that directors gain directorships at 
other firms (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Westphal & Stern, 2006; 
Westphal & Stern, 2007). Thus, directors are likely to be dissuaded 
from criticizing the compensation of CEOs with deeper voices, whom 
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directors perceive to be more willing to retaliate in response to 
criticism of their compensation. Since open discussions of CEO 
compensation are one of the most important channels to lower CEO 
compensation (Zhu, 2014), CEOs with deeper voices are likely to 
receive greater pay. Thus,  
Hypothesis 1: CEO vocal masculinity is positively associated with 
CEO compensation. 
3.2.4    The moderating effect of industry competitiveness 
In the prior section, we argued that one of the two mechanisms by 
which CEO vocal masculinity influences CEO compensation is by 
shaping perceptions of CEO quality. Here we examine how the 
positive effect of CEO vocal masculinity on CEO compensation 
through the quality perception mechanism is amplified by industry 
competitiveness. 
Inter-group competition in ancestral environments was 
characterized by recurrent episodes of violence (Bowles, 2009; Puts 
et al., 2015). Since unlike in modern contexts, leaders fought directly 
in inter-group conflicts, often on the front lines (Van Vugt, 2006; Van 
Vugt and Ronay, 2014), the evolved tendency to associate deeper 
voices with leadership quality is likely to be stronger in contexts 
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characterized by greater competition. Existing research has found 
that individuals’ preference for formidable leaders who possess 
physiological traits like vocal masculinity (Tigue et al., 2012), facial 
masculinity (Spisak et al., 2012), and musculature (Blaker & Van 
Vugt, 2014) is stronger for war-time leaders than peace-time 
leaders. Because evolved biases are tailored to the ancestral 
environment in which they evolved (Haselton et al., 2015), and inter-
group competition and physical violence went hand in hand in the 
evolutionary past (Puts et al., 2015), the preference for formidable 
leaders will strengthen even in the presence of competitive 
environments devoid of physical violence. Accordingly, we contend 
that as the competitiveness of the industry in which the firm operates 
increases, the association directors perceive between CEO vocal 
masculinity and CEO quality also strengthens. Thus,  
Hypothesis 2: Industry competitiveness strengthens the positive 
relationship between CEO vocal masculinity and CEO 
compensation.  
3.2.5    The moderating effect of CEO power 
Earlier, we argued that the second mechanism by which CEO vocal 
masculinity influences CEO compensation is by shaping directors' 
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perceptions of the CEO's willingness to retaliate. Here, we examine 
how this mechanism is amplified by CEO power.  
CEOs differ in their ability to retaliate as a function of CEO 
power (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995). 
CEOs vary in in the number of years they have served in the firm, 
which increases their legitimacy (Simsek, 2007); in the proportion of 
directors appointed during their tenure, which increases the support 
they enjoy in the board (Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990); and in 
the number of external board positions they hold, which increases 
their influence in the corporate elite (Useem, 1984). Powerful CEOs 
can rely on the support of other directors to oust critical directors 
from the board (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Hill and Phan, 1991), and 
use their influence in the corporate elite to prevent these directors 
from being appointed to other boards (Westphal and Stern, 2006; 
Westphal and Stern, 2007). 
Existing research has found that individuals systematically 
misperceive formidability signals depending on a target’s social 
power. Specifically, individuals overestimate the size of more 
powerful others (Dannenmaier & Thumin, 1964; Wilson, 1968; Yap, 
Mason, & Ames, 2013). Formidability signals convey the target’s 
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willingness to retaliate in non-violent conflicts (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; 
Petersen, 2015; Puts et al., 2015) and social power conveys the 
target’s ability to inflict costs by retaliating. Thus, perceptual 
distortions in the salience of formidability signals as a function of the 
target’s social power could serve to heighten the salience of the 
target’s willingness to retaliate when the target’s ability to inflict costs 
by retaliating increases (Haselton et al., 2015). 
Similarly, we suggest that when CEO power is high, directors 
will be more attuned to CEO vocal masculinity as an indicator of the 
CEO’s willingness to retaliate. Thus, CEO vocal masculinity will 
become more influential in deterring directors from criticizing CEO 
compensation as CEO power increases.  
Hypothesis 3: CEO power strengthens the positive relationship 
between CEO vocal masculinity and CEO compensation.  
3.2.6    The moderating effect of female representation on the 
compensation committee  
In addition to contextual factors such as industry competitiveness 
and CEO power, the effect of CEO vocal masculinity on CEO 
compensation may also be influenced by attributes of the directors 
themselves. Specifically, we argue here that greater female 
representation on the compensation committee mitigates the effect 
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of CEO vocal masculinity on CEO compensation by reducing the 
effect of both the quality and the threat biases. 
We focus on the compensation committee rather than the 
board at large for two reasons. First, the firm’s compensation 
committee is tasked with aiding the board in setting CEO 
compensation (Landsberg, 2007; Main & Johnston, 1993). Second, 
female directors may be appointed to the board for symbolic reasons 
to appease stakeholder demands, and be barred from playing a 
more substantive role in board decision-making (Bilimoria, 2007; 
Fondas & Sassalos, 2000). For example, Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) 
found evidence that sex-based discrimination makes it more difficult 
for female directors to gain membership in important committees, 
such as the compensation committee. Thus, female directors who 
are appointed to the compensation committee are likely to play a 
more substantive role in compensation decisions than female 
directors who do not serve on the committee. 
Physical violence was more influential in shaping the physical 
and psychological traits of men than women over evolutionary 
history (Bowles, 2009; McDonald, Navarrete, & Van Vugt, 2012; 
Neuberg & Schaller, 2016; Puts et al., 2015; Sell, Hone, & Pound, 
 58 
2012). This contention is corroborated by both the discovery of sex 
differences in physiological and psychological traits that aid men in 
physical conflicts (McDonald et al., 2012; Puts et al., 2014; Sell et 
al., 2012) and from archeological and anthropological evidence that 
indicate that men make up the majority of perpetrators and victims of 
violence in cultures across time and space (Archer, 2004; Archer, 
2009; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Daly & Wilson, 1990; Walker & Bailey, 
2013; Whyte, 1978).  
Accordingly, we expect female directors to be less influenced 
by biases related to formidability signals, such as vocal masculinity, 
than male directors are. First, the preference for vocal masculinity in 
leaders likely evolved as a result of the violent inter-group conflicts 
that characterized much of human evolutionary history. Since 
females were less likely to have been involved in violent inter-group 
conflicts than males (McDonald et al., 2012; Puts et al., 2015; Sell et 
al., 2012), they have a weaker preference for vocally masculine 
leaders. Consistent with this notion, an experimental study found 
that females are less likely to associate vocal masculinity with 
leadership quality than males (Klofstad et al., 2012). Second, since 
physical violence likely posed a greater threat to males than females 
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over evolutionary history, males are more attuned to vocal 
masculinity as an indicator of willingness to retaliate in conflicts than 
females. A number of studies have shown more generally that men 
are more influenced by biases related to threats from others than 
women (for a review, see McDonald et al., 2012). This pattern holds 
not only in situations where individuals may feel vulnerable to 
physical threats (Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003), but also in 
situations where there is no possibility of a physical confrontation 
(Navarrete et al., 2010; Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007).  
Based on these arguments, we suggest that female directors 
on the compensation committee are less influenced by CEO vocal 
masculinity when evaluating CEO quality, and when deciding 
whether to criticize CEO compensation. Thus, we expect that as the 
female representation on the compensation committee increases, 
the effect of CEO vocal masculinity on CEO compensation 
dampens.  
Hypothesis 4: The proportion of female directors on the 
compensation committee weakens the positive relationship between 
CEO vocal masculinity and CEO compensation.  
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3.3    Methods 
 
3.3.1    Data and sample 
Our sample consists of UK firms appearing in the FTSE 100 index 
from 2004 to 2013. Due to the surging popularity of the internet over 
the past decade, this time frame is ideal for extracting CEO speech 
from online resources within the public domain. We focus only on 
male CEOs in this study because indicators of vocal masculinity are 
highly sexually differentiated (Puts et al., 2014; Wolff & Puts, 2010) 
and listeners are better at assessing the formidability of males than 
the formidability of females from voice recordings (Sell et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, as there were only five female CEOs in our initial 
sample, performing separate regression analyses on female CEOs 
was unfeasible. However, when we added the female CEOs to our 
analysis, the results remained largely unchanged.  
Clips of CEO speech were manually gathered from company 
websites and the business press covering CEO interviews and 
speeches. The final sample consists of 169 male CEOs across 113 
firms from 2004 to 2013, representing 69% of total firm-years in our 
original sample. We performed the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K-S) test 
to compare included firm-years in our final sample with firm years 
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not included due to missing CEO speech data. The K-S test verifies 
if the distribution of variables of interest is statistically different 
between the chosen sample and overall population (Petrenko et al., 
2015; Siegel & Castellan, 1988; Westphal & Bednar, 2005). We 
confirmed that firm performance, firm size, CEO tenure, and CEO 
age were not significantly different when compared to the original 
population. 
To confirm the accuracy of our vocal masculinity measure, we 
collected additional voice data for CEOs in our sample (N=74) for 
whom audio clips of sufficient quality were available (the standards 
we used to determine whether an audio clip is acceptable are 
described below). Using the same methods for obtaining vocal 
masculinity described below, no significant differences in vocal 
masculinity (t-test of p = 0.64; r = 0.69) between different videos for 
the same CEO were observed, demonstrating the consistency of the 
method across different CEO speech clips.  
CEO compensation and CEO board appointment data was 
gathered from the BoardEx executive database. Firm financial data 
was collected from Datastream. The other variables were hand-
collected from annual reports.  
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3.3.2    Dependent variable 
CEO total compensation. CEO total compensation is 
defined as the sum of CEO salary, bonus, long-term incentive plans, 
options, restricted stock grants, and miscellaneous forms of cash 
compensation for the respective year. This variable was log 
transformed since it was highly skewed. All explanatory, moderating, 
and control variables are lagged by one year, at time t - 1, relative to 
CEO pay, at time t.  
3.3.3    Explanatory variable  
CEO vocal masculinity. We chose to measure CEO vocal 
masculinity using formant dispersion, a commonly employed 
measure of vocal masculinity in the evolutionary psychology 
literature (Puts et al., 2006; Puts et al., 2014; Wolff & Puts, 2010). 
Formant dispersion refers to the average spacing, or “dispersion,” 
between a speaker’s formants and shapes perceptions of voice 
“deepness” or “lowness” (Puts et al., 2006). Formants measure the 
resonance quality of the speaker (Hodges-Simeon, Gaulin, & Puts, 
2010; Puts et al., 2006) by capturing the frequencies at which a 
speaker’s voice does not significantly vibrate, also referred to as low 
impedance. Since formant dispersion is inversely related to vocal 
masculinity (Puts et al., 2014), we reversed the sign of our formant 
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dispersion values to obtain our vocal masculinity measure. We 
standardized the measure to facilitate interpretation.  
We use the log function of the audio program Praat 64-bit to 
measure the formant dispersion of 20-second segments of audio 
clips of CEO speech (Mayew et al., 2013; Puts, Apicella, & 
Cárdenas, 2011). In the Praat software, formants across a voice clip 
are returned as a set of four numbers denoting the resonance of a 
voice, labeled here as F1, F2, F3, and F4 (González, 2004). The 
formula for formant dispersion, Df, is  where n 
refers to the number of formant frequencies measured. 
One of our main considerations when selecting our measure 
of vocal masculinity was to avoid reverse causality. If CEOs are 
aware that executives with deeper voices are paid more, they may 
try to deepen their voice in anticipation of higher compensation. 
Existing research suggests that this could be the case with 
fundamental frequency, a vocal masculinity indicator that individuals 
can deepen to some extent to garner greater influence in competitive 
situations (Puts et al., 2006) and group discussions (Cheng et al., 
2016). 
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Formant dispersion, on the other hand, is very difficult for 
individuals to modulate. It is determined by the length of an 
individual’s vocal tract (Fitch, 1997), with longer vocal tracts 
producing deeper voices with lower formant dispersion. Existing 
research has shown that formant dispersion is largely uninfluenced 
by age once an individual reaches adulthood (Evans, Neave, & 
Wakelin, 2006), by feelings of powerfulness or powerlessness (Ko, 
Sadler, & Galinsky, 2014; Puts et al., 2006), by emotion states 
(Williams & Stevens, 1972), and by voice coaching (Ko et al., 2014). 
For example, when the former British Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher, underwent voice coaching in the 1970s to sound more 
authoritative, the formant dispersion of her voice remained the same 
while other characteristics of her voice, including her fundamental 
frequency, changed (Ko et al., 2014).  
To minimize the effect of background noise on our formant 
dispersion measures, we set the pitch floor and pitch ceiling on the 
Praat software as 75 Hertz, and 300 Hertz, respectively. This 
prevents the processing of sounds that are outside the normal 
speaking range of adult male speakers (Puts et al., 2007). We also 
did not use any clips where the background noise falls within the 
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range of our pitch floor and pitch ceiling, as determined by 
examining readings from the unvoiced portions of the clips. To 
further ensure the accuracy of our voice data, two independent 
coders selected different 20-second intervals within a CEO audio clip 
and measured their formant dispersions. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient between the two raters’ measures for formant dispersion 
is .9435 (p < .001), indicating high consistency. We took the average 
of these two measures to compute the formant dispersion for each 
CEO.  
3.3.4    Moderating variables  
Industry competitiveness. We operationalize industry 
competitiveness via the Lerner index of competition (Aghion et al., 
2005; Bloom et al., 2012; Bloom, Kretschmer, and Van Reenen, 
2011; Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Van Reenen, 2011). This was 
calculated as 1 minus the average profits divided by the average 
sales for each 3-digit SIC industry group (Bloom et al., 2012). In line 
with previous research (Bloom et al., 2012), we then took the 5-year 
rolling average of the Lerner index (e.g., for 2010, this would be the 
mean value from 2005 to 2009) and standardized the variable for the 
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regression models. Higher values mean that an industry is more 
competitive.  
CEO power. Because the CEO’s power over the board 
depends on a number of factors (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 
1992), composite measures have been increasingly utilized to 
measure CEO power (e.g. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; 
Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Krause, Filatotchev, & Bruton, 2015; 
Sauerwald, Lin, & Peng, 2016; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). Our 
study incorporates three commonly used indicators that influence 
directors’ perceptions of the CEO’s ability to retaliate against critical 
directors: (1) CEO tenure (Hill and Phan, 1991), (2) directors 
selected by the current CEO (Wade et al., 1990), and (3) CEO 
external board appointments (Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz, 2010). 
First, CEO tenure is measured as the number of years since the 
CEO started the position. Second, directors selected by the current 
CEO is calculated as the percentage of directors who joined after the 
current CEO’s induction. Third, CEO external board appointments is 
measured as the CEO’s number of current directorships at other 
corporate boards. The three components were standardized and 
then summed together. Since there was no theoretical reason to 
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single out a specific component as more important than another 
(Schmidt & Kaplan, 1971), the three components were weighed 
equally in the summation (Sauerwald et al., 2016).  
Female compensation committee representation. We 
measured female compensation committee representation as the 
proportion of female directors on the firm’s compensation committee 
(Zhang & Qu, 2015). The data used to compute this measure was 
manually gathered from annual reports. 
3.3.5    Control variables 
Firm performance. Firm performance was measured using 
return on assets, defined as a firm’s net income divided by its total 
assets. Higher firm performance should increase CEO compensation 
to reward the CEO for an effective strategy and induce the CEO to 
stay with the firm. 
Firm size. Firm size was measured as the log of total 
employees. Larger firms are more complex and the CEO’s marginal 
contributions to firm value are more important, leading to higher 
CEO pay.  
Board size. Larger boards often suffer from free riding and 
collective action problems (Dalton et al., 1999). Board size is 
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measured as the total number of directors who served on the board 
in any given year. 
CEO age. Older CEOs may have higher personal wealth 
accumulated outside of the firm, which may affect CEO pay 
practices (Kalyta, 2009). 
CEO elite status. CEO elite status is proxied by an indicator 
variable for whether or not the CEO attended Cambridge or Oxford 
for undergraduate education. CEOs who attended prestigious 
universities generally have higher prestige (Hayward, Rindova, & 
Pollock, 2004) and more social capital (Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons, 
2012), which increases CEO pay (Belliveau, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1996; 
Fiss, 2006). 
Blockholder ownership. Blockholders are able to overcome 
collective action problems and therefore are better able to monitor 
CEO pay (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995; Holderness, 2003). We 
define blockholders as shareholders holding at least 5 percent of 
shares outstanding (Thomsen, Pedersen, & Kvist, 2006). We 
summarize blockholder ownership as the cumulative proportion of 
shares held by blockholders.  
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Board independence. Board independence is an important 
control mechanism and may reduce CEO pay (Dalton et al., 1998). 
This variable was measured as the proportion of independent 
directors on the board.  
Pay mix. CEO pay mix is the ratio of fixed compensation 
(salary and bonus) to total compensation for that respective year 
(Sauerwald et al., 2016). A lower pay mix often results in calls for 
increased total CEO compensation owing to increased 
compensation risk (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999). Year and 
industry controls are included in all models.  
3.3.6    Analytical strategy 
Selection-induced endogeneity may be a concern in our analysis if 
CEOs with deep voices are not randomly distributed across firms 
(Antonakis et al., 2010). This source of endogeneity arises if 
unobservable factors impacting whether the firm is headed by a 
CEO with a deep voice are also related to our dependent variable of 
CEO compensation. For instance, boards wishing their firms to 
pursue bold competitive actions (such as entering more competitive 
industries) could be more likely to appoint CEOs with deeper voices. 
These firms are also likely to pay their CEOs more. 
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To alleviate this issue, we followed Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) and Malhotra et al.’s (2017) two-stage approach. In the first 
stage, we examined a number of factors that may influence the 
selection of CEOs with deeper voices. These include board size, 
board independence, firm ownership, firm performance, and industry 
competitiveness. We do not examine CEO-specific attributes in 
predicting CEO vocal masculinity because formant dispersion—our 
measure of vocal masculinity—is largely outside of the control of the 
CEO. Due to the identification problems that arise when all of the 
variables in the first stage selection equation are also in the second 
stage (Sartori, 2003), we included the proportion of female directors 
on the board’s nomination committee as the exclusion restriction 
unique to the first-stage. We expect that female representation on 
the nomination committee will influence the vocal masculinity of the 
CEO heading the firm because of the importance of the nomination 
committee in CEO succession decisions, but we do not expect this 
variable to influence CEO compensation. The significant parameters 
from the first-stage (i.e., industry competitiveness and female 
representation on the nomination committee) were then used to 
estimate a predicted value of CEO vocal masculinity, which accounts 
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for the fact that some firms are more likely to be headed by CEOs 
with deeper voices (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Malhotra et al., 
2017). This endogeneity control is then included in the second-stage 
model to control for possible selection-induced endogeneity. 
In the second-stage CEO compensation model, our data 
precludes us from proceeding with a clustered ordinary least 
squares regression analysis. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is 
problematic for panel data analysis due to the unobserved 
heterogeneity in terms of within-firm and between-firm effects 
(Afuah, 2001). This can lead to three potential forms of bias: cross-
sectional autocorrelation, heteroskedascticity, and serial 
autocorrelation (Sine, Haveman, & Tolbert, 2005). Firm-fixed effects 
panel models are often preferred, but fixed effects panel models are 
ineffective in estimating slowly-changing or time-invariant effects, 
which in our case includes CEO vocal masculinity. To accommodate 
these challenges, we adopt a generalized least square cross-
sectional time series regression, thereby correcting for potential 
heteroskedasticity and modeling first-order autocorrelation in the 
error terms (Bednar, Love, & Kraatz, 2015; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 
2010; Zhu & Chen, 2015). Cross-sectional time series analysis is 
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fitting for investigating longitudinal data with a continuous dependent 
variable (Bednar et al., 2015). This analytical method generates a 
matrix-weighted average of between-firm and within-firm effects 
(Afuah, 2001; Stata, 1999). It also allows for autocorrelation in the 
error terms, which efficiently estimates variables that vary over time 
(Bednar et al., 2015).  
 
3.4    Results 
 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for 
the variables used in this study. Model 1 in Table 1 displays the first-
stage regression model used to account for the vocal masculinity of 
the CEO heading a given firm. Firms operating in more competitive 
industries (p < 0.001) and firms with a lower proportion of female 
directors serving on the nomination committee (p < 0.05) tend to be 
headed by CEOs with deeper voices.  
Table 2 also presents the models used for the second-stage 
including the endogeneity control derived from the first-stage model. 
Model 2 shows our baseline model with only the control and 
moderating variables; the direction and statistical significance of 
these variables are largely as expected. Model 3 introduces our 
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main construct of CEO vocal masculinity (i.e., the standardized value 
of the negative of formant dispersion). Models 4, 5 and 6 include the 
interaction terms to evaluate our moderating hypotheses pertaining 
respectively to industry competitiveness, CEO power, and female 
compensation committee representation. Model 7 displays the full 
model with all interaction terms and moderators present.  
 Hypothesis 1 argues that CEOs with greater CEO vocal 
masculinity will receive higher compensation because directors 
associate CEO vocal masculinity with both CEO quality and with the 
CEO’s willingness to retaliate against directors who criticize CEO 
compensation. We find support for Hypothesis 1, not only in Model 3 
(p < 0.001), but also in every model thereafter (Model 4, p < 0.001; 
Model 5, p < 0.001; Model 6, p < 0.001; Model 7, p < 0.001). Based 
on Model 3, we also find that a one standard deviation increase in 
CEO vocal masculinity is associated with a 5.9 percent increase in 
total pay, indicating that the effect of CEO vocal masculinity on CEO 
compensation is economically significant. 
 Hypothesis 2 proposes that the relationship between CEO 
vocal masculinity and CEO compensation will be strengthened in 
firms that operate in more competitive industries. Since inter-group 
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competition over evolutionary history was characterized by recurrent 
violence, the association between CEO vocal masculinity and 
perceptions of CEO quality is stronger in more competitive 
industries. The interaction term in Model 4 (p < 0.001) shows 
support for this hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 3 refers to the interaction between CEO power 
and CEO vocal masculinity, arguing that CEO power positively 
moderates the relationship between CEO vocal masculinity and 
CEO compensation because CEO vocal masculinity will be more 
influential in deterring directors from criticizing the compensation of 
powerful CEOs. The interaction term in Model 5 (p < 0.05) shows 
support for this hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 4 argues that greater female representation on 
the compensation committee negatively moderates the relationship 
between CEO vocal masculinity and CEO compensation because 
CEO vocal masculinity influences the judgment of female directors 
less than the judgment of male directors. The interaction term in 
model 6 (p < 0.01) shows support for this hypothesis.  
 Model 7 contains the full model with all variables and 
moderating variables included. The results in Model 7 are largely 
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similar to those observed in Models 2 to 6 (Hypothesis 1, p < 0.001; 
Hypothesis 2, p < 0.001; Hypothesis 3, p < 0.01; Hypothesis 4, p < 
0.05).  
3.4.1    Robustness checks and additional analyses 
We performed three additional tests to further evaluate our original 
hypotheses. First, we included an alternative adjustment for 
selection-induced endogeneity by using a Heckman selection model 
(Heckman, 1979; Shaver, 1998). Although the Heckman selection 
model is commonly used to correct for sample selection bias, it can 
also be used to address selection induced endogeneity (Chang, 
Kogut, & Yang, 2016; Shaver, 1998). In the first stage, we estimated 
a probit model to predict the probability of a firm having a CEO with 
a vocal masculinity above the median value within our sample. The 
parameters from the first-stage were then used to generate the 
inverse Mills ratio (IMR), which accounts for the likelihood of firms 
with particular traits hiring CEOs with deeper voices. The IMR is then 
included in the second-stage model as a control for possible 
selection. We included the proportion of female directors on the 
firm’s nomination committee as the exclusion restriction in the first-
stage (Sartori, 2003). In the second-stage Heckman, the results are 
 76 
largely similar to findings from the two-stage model used in our main 
regressions (Hypothesis 1, p < 0.001; Hypothesis 2, p < 0.001; 
Hypothesis 3, p < 0.05; Hypothesis 4, p < 0.05). 
Second, we used CEO tenure as an indicator of CEO power 
in our main analysis, which is consistent with existing research 
(Golden & Zajac, 2001; Hill & Phan, 1991; Ocasio, 1994). We 
argued that as CEO power increases, directors will be more attuned 
to CEO vocal masculinity as a cue to the CEO’s willingness to 
retaliate, strengthening the effect of CEO vocal masculinity on CEO 
compensation. However, some research suggests that CEO tenure 
may also weaken the effect of CEO quality biases. According to this 
logic, since the board has more information about the CEO later in 
the CEO’s tenure (Graffin et al., 2013), the effect of CEO vocal 
masculinity on perceptions of CEO quality should diminish as CEO 
tenure increases. Thus, CEO tenure could weaken the effect of CEO 
vocal masculinity on CEO compensation. We examine both 
possibilities empirically by testing the moderating effect of CEO 
tenure on the CEO vocal masculinity-CEO compensation 
relationship. Our finding that the CEO tenure interaction term has a 
positive sign (coefficient of 0.05 with p < 0.001) suggests that the 
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strengthening of the CEO threat bias as CEO tenure increases has a 
greater effect on the relationship between CEO vocal masculinity 
and CEO compensation than the weakening of the CEO quality bias. 
Third, while we noted the shortcomings of OLS analysis 
above, we re-ran our main regressions with OLS estimation 
clustered at the firm level. The results did not change substantively 
(Hypothesis 1, p < 0.05; Hypothesis 2, p < 0.05; Hypothesis 3, p < 
0.10; Hypothesis 4, p < 0.10). 
3.5    Discussion 
 
We set out to theoretically and empirically examine how CEO vocal 
masculinity influences the board’s decisions on CEO compensation. 
We argued that CEO vocal masculinity shapes CEO compensation 
by influencing directors’ perceptions of CEO quality, and their 
perceptions of the CEO’s willingness to retaliate against directors 
who criticize CEO compensation. We identify these separate 
mechanisms by testing two moderating conditions—industry 
competitiveness, and CEO power—where each of these biases is 
particularly strong. We also argued that female representation on the 
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compensation committee mitigates the effect of both biases. Our 
empirical results provide support for our hypothesized predictions. 
3.5.1    Theoretical contributions 
Our study makes three major theoretical contributions. First, we 
contribute to the corporate governance literature by introducing a 
novel evolutionary psychology approach to examine both the direct 
effect of CEO vocal masculinity on CEO compensation, and the 
boundary conditions that shape this relationship. Prevailing accounts 
of vocal masculinity in corporate leadership have directed their 
attention on the benefits that accrue to those who possess them, 
and largely avoided discussing when these biases are more or less 
likely to play a salient role. This is consistent with existing research, 
which has primarily focused on showing that these biases exist. In 
contrast, we use insights from evolutionary psychology to 
demonstrate that theories regarding the origin and evolved function 
of vocal masculinity biases can be used to make testable predictions 
regarding the conditions that shape the CEO vocal masculinity-CEO 
compensation relationship (Buss, 2014; Kenrick et al., 2010). 
Collectively, the boundary conditions we examine—industry 
competitiveness, CEO power, and female representation on the 
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compensation committee—contribute to a non-deterministic 
understanding of the role of vocal masculinity in corporate 
governance. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on CEO evaluations by 
examining how CEO vocal masculinity could discourage directors 
from criticizing CEO compensation. Governance scholars have 
begun to recognize that formal evaluations of the CEO, such as 
financial analyst recommendations (Westphal & Clement, 2008) and 
media coverage by journalists (Westphal & Deephouse, 2011), are 
influenced by stakeholders’ fear of retaliation from the CEO. Prior 
research in the managerial power stream has highlighted the 
importance of past threatening actions by the CEO (Westphal & 
Clement, 2008; Westphal & Deephouse, 2011) and the CEO’s 
objective ability to retaliate (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004), in shaping 
perceptions of CEO threat. We add to this literature by arguing that 
one of the two mechanisms by which CEO vocal masculinity can 
influence CEO compensation is by increasing directors’ perceptions 
of the CEO’s willingness to retaliate. We also argued that the effect 
of this threat bias is strengthened when the CEO’s objective ability to 
retaliate, as measured by CEO power, increases. Our supportive 
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empirical findings indicate that threat perceptions during formal 
evaluations of the CEO may arise not only from objective 
considerations as demonstrated by past research, but also from 
seemingly trivial physiological features, such as the deepness of the 
CEO's voice.  
Third, our study contributes to research on gender diversity. 
There is an ongoing debate in the gender diversity literature whether 
female representation has an effect on board decision-making. 
Some scholars have argued, building on existing research on gender 
differences, that female directors will behave differently from male 
directors in a number of ways (Chen et al., 2016; Huang & Kisgen, 
2013; Levi et al., 2014). Others have argued that these differences 
are less likely to play a role in the upper echelons because directors 
are a highly selected group, i.e., the type of men and women who 
make it to the top of the organization are similar to each other, but 
different from their counterparts in the general population (Adams & 
Ragunathan, 2013; Bertrand & Hallock, 2001; Economist, 2015). 
The empirical evidence on the effect of female representation 
remains mixed (e.g., Adams & Ragunathan, 2013; Chen et al., 2016; 
Levi et al., 2014; Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff, 2016). We argue 
 81 
based on evolutionary reasoning that female directors differ from 
male directors in that female directors tend to be less influenced by 
vocal masculinity. Our theoretical predictions and supportive 
empirical findings corroborate the view that gender differences are 
important in understanding board outcomes.  
3.5.2    Practical contribution 
Our research can be used by practitioners to reduce the effect of 
CEO vocal masculinity on board decision-making. First, research in 
evolutionary psychology indicates that by making individuals aware 
of the conditions under which specific evolved biases are likely to 
play a salient role, they can gain some control (albeit limited) over 
how much they are influenced by these biases (Buss, 2014). Thus, 
for example, making directors aware that they will be more 
influenced by CEO vocal masculinity when assessing CEO quality in 
more competitive industries may mitigate the effect of this bias on 
board decision-making. Second, boards can use knowledge 
regarding individual differences in susceptibility to specific biases to 
change board composition. To this end, boards can increase the 
representation of female directors on important committees because 
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female directors are less influenced by CEO vocal masculinity than 
male directors. 
3.5.3    Limitations and future research 
As with all forms of empirical research, our study has some 
limitations that point to opportunities for refinement and future 
research. First, we focus only on male CEOs. Thus, our results 
might not be generalizable to female CEOs who make up an 
increasing percentage of CEOs of large firms around the world. A 
study of the vocal masculinity of female CEOs would be especially 
interesting as females may face a tradeoff between vocal 
masculinity, which conveys both leadership quality (Klofstad et al., 
2012) and dominance (Borkowska & Pawlowski, 2011; Jones et al., 
2010), and vocal femininity, which conveys attractiveness (Collins & 
Missing, 2003; Feinberg et al., 2005). This trade-off does not seem 
to be faced by males (Klofstad et al., 2016; Puts et al., 2014).  
Second, while we examined CEOs of UK firms in our study, it 
is possible that the tendency to associate vocal masculinity with 
CEO quality may vary across cultures. Existing research suggests 
that the preference for formidability signals is weaker in more 
cooperative settings (e.g., Spisak et al., 2012). Thus, it could be the 
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case that in less individualistic cultures such as Japan where 
decision-making authority tends to rest with a group of executives 
rather than solely the CEO (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007, 2011), the 
preference for CEOs with deeper voices is likely weaker. 
 Third, we focus only on biases associated with formidability 
signals in the voice—vocal masculinity—and not on biases 
associated with other formidability signals. While we explained that 
CEO vocal masculinity is likely to be particularly important in 
CEO/board relations, studies under controlled experimental 
conditions suggest it is possible that formidability signals in the body 
and face could also influence perceptions of CEO quality, and 
perceptions of the CEO’s willingness to retaliate (Blaker & Van Vugt, 
2014; Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Petersen, 2015). Future research could 
examine the relative influence of different formidability signals on 
influencing directors.  
3.6    Conclusion 
 
Although existing research suggests that there are benefits to 
possessing a deep voice in leadership contexts, there is very little 
research examining this phenomenon at the top of the organization. 
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What we argue and find is that while CEO vocal masculinity 
positively influences the board’s decision on CEO compensation, 
this effect is contingent on industry competitiveness, CEO power, 
and female representation in the compensation committee. In this 
way, our research promotes a non-deterministic understanding of 
how vocal masculinity influences corporate governance outcomes. 
We also shed greater light on the process by which perceptions of 
CEO threat are formed in formal CEO evaluations, as well as the 
importance of gender differences in understanding board outcomes. 
It is our hope that our research will be useful for researchers, 
boards, and other stakeholders in understanding the effects of vocal 
masculinity biases, and to devise ways to reduce their effects. 
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3.7.2    Table 2. Regressions: The effect of CEO vocal 
masculinity on CEO total compensation 
Variables Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 Female 
nomin
ation 
comm
ittee  
-0.50*             
   
repres
entati
on 
(0.26)       
Industry 
p
e itive
ness 
0.12*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Pay mix  -
0
.
9
1
*
*
* 
-
0
.
9
4
*
*
* 
-
0
.
9
2
*
*
* 
-
0
.
9
5
*
*
* 
-
0
.
9
6
*
*
* 
-
0
.
9
5
*
*
* 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Firm size -0.01  0.09***  0.08***  0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Firm 
perfor
manc
e 
-0.42  1.28*** 1.33*** 1.32*** 1.29*** 1.30*** 1.25*** 
 (0.47) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Female 
comp
ensati
on 
comm
ittee  
 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   
repres
e tati
on 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
CEO power  0.04***  0.03** 0.03*** 0.02+ 0.03*** 0.02* 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CEO elite status  0.01  0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
CEO age  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Board size 0.01  0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Board 
indep
enden
ce 
-0.10  0.64***  0.61***  0.58*** 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.59*** 
 (0.28) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Blockhold r 
owner
ship 
-0.02  -0.23*  -0.18+ -0.19+ -0.19+ -0.24* -0.24* 
 (0.22) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Second-stage 
endog
eneity 
contr
ol 
 -
1
.
1
5
*
*
*
  
-
1
.
0
4
*
*
* 
-
1
.
0
2
*
*
* 
-
1
.
1
1
*
*
* 
-
1
.
1
1
*
*
*
  
-
1
.
1
3
*
*
* 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) 
Hypothesis 
Tes in
g 
       
CEO vocal 
mascu
linity 
(H1, 
+) 
  0.06***  0.05*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 
   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
CEO vocal 
masculinity X 
Industry 
competitiven
ess (H2, +) 
   0.07***   0.06***  
   (0.01)   (0.02) 
CEO vocal 
masculinity X 
CEO power 
(H3, +) 
    0.01*   0.01**  
    (0.00)  (0.01) 
CEO vocal 
masculinity X 
Female comp. 
committee rep. 
(H4, -) 
     -0.28**  -0.25*  
     (0.10) (0.10) 
       
Constant 0.17  7.24***  7.11***  7.26***  7.08*** 7.17*** 7.23*** 
 (0.28) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
Observations 793 793 793 793 793 793 793 
χ2 21.4 884 1432 972 1051 1517 1731 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Year and industry controls are included. 
+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; two-tailed tests for both hypothesized variables 
and controls.  
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Chapter 4. Man Up: The Influence of Board 
Political Ideology on the Selection of Masculine 
CEOs 
 
ABSTRACT  
Despite an abundance of studies examining the causes and 
consequences of CEO succession, the strategic leadership literature 
has yielded surprisingly little insight into one of the most central 
puzzles surrounding the CEO selection process: Why do CEOs look 
the way they do? We explore this question by focusing on how 
directors’ political ideologies, and specifically their positions on the 
liberalism-conservatism spectrum, manifest in boards’ selections of 
more (versus less) masculine male CEO candidates. Integrating 
research in evolutionary psychology, political ideology, and 
behavioral corporate governance, we theorize that conservative and 
liberal boards will differ in their relative sensitivities to threat, which 
will in turn influence their propensities to choose more masculine 
CEOs to lead their firms. We further examine whether this 
relationship becomes amplified in more threatening contexts, 
specifically in poorly performing firms and in slowly growing 
industries. Using an innovative methodology to assess masculinity 
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as reflected in CEOs’ faces and voices, we test our ideas on a 
sample of 528 CEO succession events at S&P 1500 firms from 2007 
to 2013. Results provide considerable support for our theory. We 
discuss the contributions of our study for research on CEO 
succession, diversity in the corporate elite, and implicit leadership 
theory.  
 
4.1    Introduction 
Why do chief executive officers (CEOs) look the way they do? 
While this puzzle remains surprisingly underexplored (Hambrick, 
2007; Wowak, Gomez-Mejia, and Steinbach, 2017), it touches on a 
broader question that has long been of interest to management 
scholars (Bass and Stogdill, 1990; Eagly and Karau, 1991): Why are 
some individuals more likely than others to be chosen as leaders? 
According to implicit leadership theory, such choices are in part the 
result of audiences’ pre-existing notions of what constitutes a 
prototypical leader (Gupta and Misangyi, 2018; Lord and Maher, 
1991). These leadership schemas are associated with a variety of 
idealized traits and abilities (Epitropaki et al., 2013), but considerable 
work suggests that one’s masculinity is a potent predictor of 
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leadership emergence, particularly for males (Klofstad, Anderson, 
and Peters, 2012; Spisak et al., 2012; Tigue et al., 2012; Van Vugt 
and Ronay, 2013). Observer perceptions of masculinity, or the 
extent to which an individual exhibits prototypically male attributes, 
emanate from physical features such as one’s face and voice 
(Feinberg et al., 2008; Puts et al., 2012; Wolff and Puts, 2010). This 
evolutionary bias, which can trace its roots to early ancestral 
societies in which leadership was closely tied with the ability to 
prevail in physical combat (Van Vugt and Ronay, 2013; Petersen, 
2015), predisposes observers to select more masculine-seeming 
individuals for leadership roles (Klofstad et al., 2012; Little et al., 
2007; Spisak et al., 2012; Tigue et al., 2012).  
Could this predilection also influence boards’ CEO selection 
decisions? A wealth of research has shown that directors are subject 
to decision-making biases (for a review, see Westphal and Zajac, 
2013), which raises the possibility that at least some boards may 
unconsciously favor CEO candidates with more masculine traits. The 
high-stakes nature of CEO selection decisions lends further 
credence to this idea, as the masculinity bias tends to be most 
pronounced in situations characterized by high levels of threat (Little 
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et al., 2007; Spisak et al., 2012; Tigue et al., 2012). The potential 
organizational consequences of such a bias are also noteworthy, as 
recent evidence indicates that more masculine CEOs tend to engage 
in more financial misreporting (Jia, Lent, and Zeng, 2014), receive 
higher compensation (Nair and Haque, 2016; Mayew, Parsons, and 
Venkatachalam, 2013), and garner higher market valuations for their 
firms (Joshi et al., 2017). Yet despite these implications, little is 
known about whether masculinity is a contributing factor when 
boards select their CEOs. 
Given the central role of threat perceptions in driving 
observers’ preferences for more masculine leaders (Little et al., 
2007; Spisak et al., 2012; Tigue et al., 2012), it follows that directors’ 
subjective evaluations of threat could help determine the extent to 
which they gravitate toward more masculine CEO candidates who fit 
the classic mold of a strong leader. Research in political psychology 
suggests that these threat perceptions will vary as a function of 
political ideology (Vigil, 2010; Fessler, Pisor, and Holbrook, 2017), 
which reflect individuals’ deeply held values and preferences (Jost, 
Federico, and Napier, 2009). Building on the logic of upper echelons 
theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), which holds that corporate 
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leaders’ decisions reflect their individual values and preferences, 
researchers have shown that political ideologies affect executives’ 
strategic decisions (Chin, Hambrick, and Treviño, 2013; Gupta, 
Briscoe, and Hambrick, 2017) and, closer to our domain, directors’ 
governance decisions (Gupta and Wowak, 2017). The hiring of a 
CEO is one of the most critical governance decisions that a board 
must make, and ample research suggests that directors’ ideologies 
will influence the characteristics they look for in a CEO. 
This basic logic undergirds our study. Integrating concepts 
from the literatures on evolutionary psychology, political ideology, 
and behavioral corporate governance, we examine how directors’ 
ideologies, and specifically the board-level average of how 
conservative or liberal its directors are, manifest in decisions to hire 
more (versus less) masculine male1 CEOs. Existing evidence 
suggests that conservatives (as compared to liberals) are more 
sensitive to threat in the external environment (Jost et al., 2007). If 
conservative boards are more sensitive to threat, they should be 
 
1 As a point of clarification, masculinity can be assessed for both males and females, with 
the latter generally scoring lower on the dimension. But because there are relatively few 
female CEOs in our population of interest (large public companies), we focus on male 
CEOs only in our arguments and empirical tests. As we discuss in a later section, however, 
our results are robust to the inclusion of female CEOs. 
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more prone to the masculinity bias in their evaluations of potential 
CEO candidates. Our central argument is thus that CEOs hired by 
conservative boards will exhibit more masculine traits than will CEOs 
hired by liberal boards. 
We also theorize that this relationship will vary depending 
upon the contextual conditions facing the firm at the time of 
succession. While a conservative board’s heightened sensitivity to 
threat should generally predispose it toward more masculine CEO 
candidates, this effect will arguably be more pronounced when the 
firm is facing an objectively difficult situation. Threats should loom 
even larger for conservative boards in such contexts, the result of 
which will be a stronger activation of the masculinity preference. We 
therefore propose that the effect of board conservatism on CEO 
masculinity will be amplified in highly threatening contexts, 
specifically in recently underperforming firms and in slow-growth 
industries. 
Testing our ideas on a sample of 528 CEO succession events 
at S&P 1500 firms from 2007 to 2013, we use an innovative 
methodology to assess masculinity as reflected in CEOs’ faces and 
voices. This technique, which we will discuss in detail below and 
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which has been validated and used in evolutionary psychology 
research (e.g., Lefevre et al., 2012; Puts et al., 2014), involves 
measuring (1) facial masculinity by using the lower face to face-
height ratio as computed from the measurements of facial images, 
and (2) vocal masculinity via the formant dispersion (which relates to 
the “deepness” or “lowness” of one’s voice) as computed from clips 
of spoken audio.  
Our study offers several key contributions. First, we shed new 
light on a compelling but curiously understudied question: Why do 
CEOs look the way they do? In demonstrating that directors’ political 
ideologies affect the types of leaders they gravitate toward, our study 
offers novel insight into boards’ CEO selection decisions. Second, 
we contribute to the burgeoning literature on diversity in the 
corporate elite, which with rare exceptions has almost exclusively 
focused on gender, race, and social class background as the basis 
for preferential treatment (e.g., Kulich et al., 2011; Maclean, Harvey, 
and Kling, 2014; Westphal and Stern, 2007; Stern and Westphal, 
2010). We extend this conversation by illustrating that masculinity (or 
a lack thereof) can play a role in brightening (or dimming) one’s 
career prospects – even among those at the perceived apex of the 
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corporate elite (white, upper-class males). And third, we contribute to 
implicit leadership theory by showing that even the activation of 
leadership prototypes with deep evolutionary origins can vary 
according to individuals’ idiosyncratic beliefs and preferences. 
4.2    Theory and Hypotheses 
 
4.2.1    CEO selection as a critical board task 
The CEO sits at the helm of the modern organization, shaping 
its strategic posture, its culture, and ultimately its fate and fortune 
(for a review, see Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). 
Directors often describe the choosing of a CEO as one of the most 
important decisions that a board must make (Caldwell et al., 1999), a 
sentiment that is borne out by the many studies illustrating that CEO 
succession decisions have an important effect on firm performance 
(Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Hambrick and 
Quigley, 2014; Mackey, 2008; Quigley and Hambrick, 2015). Indeed, 
the “CEO effect” on firm performance has become amplified over the 
last few decades (Quigley and Hambrick, 2015), some correlates of 
which include growing attention to CEOs in the business press 
(Quigley and Hambrick, 2015), increases in CEO pay relative to the 
pay of other top managers (Frydman and Jenter, 2010), and greater 
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sensitivity of CEO dismissals to firm performance (Kaplan and 
Minton, 2012; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004).  
Much of the existing research has tended to focus on the 
person-situation fit aspect of boards’ CEO selection decisions. 
According to this view, for a firm to maximize its odds of future 
success, its executives should possess experience and abilities that 
align with the needs of the firm (Chen and Hambrick, 2012; Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 1984; Hambrick and Crozier, 1985). Thus, as the 
needs of the firm change, so too do the characteristics that boards 
seek in a CEO. For instance, CEO attributes such as education, 
functional expertise, and age tend to co-vary with factors including 
the firm’s life cycle phase (Drazin and Kazanjian, 1993), the industry 
in which it operates (Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998), and its legal 
environment (Fligstein, 1987). Relatedly, and consistent with the 
idea that the choice of a CEO is in part a reflection of the board’s 
relative desire for change (Vancil 1987; Lorsch and MacIver 1989), 
numerous studies have found that incoming CEOs tend to come 
from outside (inside) the company when pre-succession 
performance is poor (good) (Allen, Panian, and Lotz, 1979; Boeker 
and Goodstein, 1993; Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993). 
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While directors may strive to be rational when hiring new 
CEOs, these decisions are far from straightforward. As many 
scholars have noted (e.g., Khurana, 2002; Groysberg, McLean, and 
Nohria, 2006), the selection process is fraught with uncertainty. First, 
the ex ante evaluation of CEO ability is difficult. Most CEO 
candidates have never held the CEO position before, having instead 
served as heads of divisions or in other executive positions (chief 
financial officer, chief operating offer, etc.) (Finkelstein, Hambrick, 
and Cannella, 2009). These executive roles, while important to the 
functioning of an organization, do not entail nearly as much decision-
making responsibility or managerial discretion as does the CEO 
position (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Further, available 
performance metrics (e.g., profits, market share, etc.) reflect not only 
the contributions of the focal executive, but also external factors 
outside of the executive’s control such as fluctuations in industry 
conditions (Holmstrom, 1982) and contributions of other managers 
(Boeker, 1992; Graffin et al., 2008). For instance, while top 
managers of high-performing firms who have worked under well-
known CEOs are more likely to become CEOs themselves (Graffin 
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et al., 2008), they also tend to perform worse than their former 
bosses (Groysberg, McLean, and Nohria, 2006).  
  Second, boards face information processing limitations that 
complicate the task of CEO selection (Boivie et al., 2016; Graffin, 
Boivie, and Carpenter, 2013). CEO succession decisions are highly 
complex, requiring directors to comprehend the needs of the focal 
firm, its environment, and the abilities of potential successors. 
Moreover, directors serve the firm on a part-time basis, and typically 
must devote a substantial amount of time and effort to their own full-
time jobs in addition to other board appointments (Ferris, 
Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Field, 
Lowry, and Mkrtchyan, 2013). These factors can contribute to 
cognitive overload and less-than-rational decision making (Boivie et 
al., 2016; Oldroyd and Morris, 2002).   
Third, and just like the rest of us, directors are subject to 
cognitive biases (summarized in Westphal and Zajac, 2013). 
Behavioral governance scholars have examined how biases 
influence a number of board decisions, including strategic 
persistence (Westphal and Bednar, 2005), acquisition premiums 
(Zhu, 2013), director selection (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Zhu, 
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Shen, and Hillman, 2014; Zhu and Westphal, 2014), CEO 
compensation (Graffin, Boivie, and Carpenter, 2013; Westphal and 
Zajac, 1995; Zhu and Westphal, 2014; Zhu, 2014), and CEO 
dismissal (Graffin, Boivie, and Carpenter, 2013). However, there is 
relatively little research on how biases influence directors’ CEO 
selection decisions.  
In one of the few studies to examine this issue, Westphal and 
Zajac (1996) found that boards tend to prefer CEO successors who 
resemble their own demographic profiles, which offers evidence of 
similarity-attraction bias in CEO selection decisions. In another 
example, Khurana (2002) illustrated that boards often make 
suboptimal CEO choices due to an “irrational” preference for 
charismatic leaders who appear colorful and exciting but whose 
skills and abilities may not align well with what the firm needs. 
Khurana’s work in particular suggests that boards may have 
idealized notions of what constitutes a good leader, and that these 
biases – ill-founded though they may be – shape their CEO selection 
decisions. 
 Along these lines, implicit leadership theory suggests that the 
preference for leaders who possess certain attributes arises 
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because individuals possess cognitive schemas regarding what a 
competent leader looks like (for a review, see Junker and Dick, 
2014). The traditional understanding has been that these leadership 
prototypes, which are contextually dependent, are deeply rooted in 
culturally-imprinted perceptions regarding attributes that imply 
promise of effective leadership (Junker and Dick, 2014). Individuals 
who possess these attributes are viewed as better leaders, and are 
therefore more likely to be selected into leadership positions. At the 
same time, existing research has found that individuals differ in their 
perceptions of leadership quality – even when facing objectively 
similar contextual conditions (Atkins and Woods, 2002; Scullen, 
Mount, and Goff, 2008) – which is indicative of differences in the 
implicit leadership prototypes held by individuals (Junker and Dick, 
2014). The literature on implicit leadership thus suggests that: (1) 
leader selection is affected by evaluators’ implicit leadership biases; 
(2) the activation of these biases is contingent on contextual 
conditions; and (3) evaluators can significantly differ in their beliefs 
about what an ideal leader looks like.  
While implicit leadership prototypes have traditionally been 
viewed as socially learned (Javidan et al., 2006), evolutionary 
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psychology research has illustrated that some of these prototypes 
have deep evolutionary origins (Junker and Dick, 2014; Petersen, 
2015; Spisak et al., 2012; Van Vugt and Ronay, 2013). Drawing on 
this latter work, we next discuss how evolutionary leadership 
prototypes related to masculine physiological features create 
advantages for individuals who possess these attributes such that 
they are perceived as more competent leaders (particularly when 
contextual conditions connote threat). We then explore how board 
political conservatism – as an important audience characteristic that 
we theorize will be associated with a stronger masculinity bias – 
shapes the CEO selection process. 
4.2.2    Masculinity and leader selection 
According to evolutionary scientists, the masculine leadership 
prototype evolved in the context of pervasive violent conflicts over 
human evolutionary history (Petersen, 2015; Puts et al., 2014). 
Prevailing in these conflicts allowed the victor to gain greater access 
to material resources and mates, whereas defeat often meant a loss 
in social status, potentially debilitating injuries, and even death 
(Manson and Wrangham, 1991; Puts et al., 2015). Given that 
individuals vary in their formidability – or their capacity to prevail in 
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violent conflicts – humans appear to have developed the ability to 
accurately assess the formidability of others from outwardly 
perceivable physiological signals. Indeed, research across cultures 
has found that individuals are able to gauge another individual’s 
formidability using information gleaned from the other’s face, voice, 
and body (Durkee, Goetz, and Lukaszewski, 2017; Little et al., 2015; 
Sell et al., 2009; Sell et al., 2010). This instinct has been argued to 
provide an evolutionary advantage by inducing individuals to engage 
in violent conflicts when the likelihood of success is relatively high, 
and to yield to opponents when the likelihood of failure is relatively 
high (Hammerstein and Parker, 1982; Petersen et al., 2013). 
Because violent encounters posed a greater challenge to 
survival and reproduction for human males than females (Bowles, 
2009; McDonald et al., 2012; Neuberg and Schaller, 2016; Puts et 
al., 2015; Sell et al., 2012), formidability signals are highly sexually 
dimorphic (i.e., males and females meaningfully differ along the 
relevant dimensions). Across cultures, men – while varying on these 
characteristics themselves – have more muscular bodies (Lassek 
and Gaulin, 2009; Wells, 2012), deeper voices characterized by 
lower timbre (Puts, Gaulin, and Verdolini, 2006; Puts et al., 2014), 
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and the lower half of their faces are longer relative to the length of 
their full face (Penton-Voak et al., 2001; Lefevre et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, males deemed by others to be higher on these 
dimensions tend to be perceived as more masculine (Feinberg et al., 
2008; Puts et al., 2012; Wolff and Puts, 2010).   
Following a masculine leader was beneficial in ancestral 
environments characterized by threats from inter-group competition. 
For the relatively small coalitional groups that were common in the 
evolutionary past, masculine leaders could provide protection from 
physical violence, credibly enforce group norms, and serve as an 
intimidating presence in negotiations with other coalitions (Chagnon, 
1983; Lukaszewski et al., 2016; Von Reuden, 2014). Over time, this 
gave rise to evolved biases that associate masculine physiological 
features with leadership effectiveness (Petersen, 2015; Puts et al., 
2014). And because this relationship tended to be stronger when 
threats were high (Little et al., 2007; Spisak et al., 2012; Tigue et al., 
2012), the activation of these biases is at least partially contingent 
on evaluators’ perceptions of threat.  
Consistent with these arguments, considerable research 
using voice recordings and facial images manipulated with respect to 
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masculinity have found that individuals prefer more masculine 
leaders (Klofstad et al., 2012; Little et al., 2007; Spisak et al., 2012; 
Tigue et al., 2012), especially when contextual conditions connote 
threat (Little et al., 2007; Spisak et al., 2012; Tigue et al., 2012). 
Additionally, research examining vocal masculinity and leadership 
selection in the modern political sphere (e.g., the election of national 
legislators [Klofstad, 2016] and presidents [Banai, Banai, and Bovan, 
2017]) also suggests a general preference for more masculine 
leaders.   
Given the central role of perceptions of threat in predisposing 
individuals toward masculine leaders, it seems plausible that the 
preference for masculine leaders will vary depending on how 
sensitive individuals are to potential threat cues. As we describe 
below, considerable research suggests that these threat perceptions 
will vary as a function of individuals’ political ideologies. 
4.2.3    Implications of board political ideology  
Political ideology, broadly defined as one’s views regarding 
“how society should be governed” (Jost et al., 2009: 309), is a 
fundamental dispositional attribute that “helps to explain why people 
do what they do” (Jost, 2006: 653).  Scholars have proffered a 
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number of different dimensions and labels to describe political 
ideology (Slomp, 2000), but the liberal-conservative (or left-right) 
spectrum has been deemed the “most useful and parsimonious way 
to classify political attitudes” (Jost, 2006: 654). Whereas 
conservatives2 are more likely to support capital punishment, hold a 
more positive view of the military and law enforcement, and believe 
in the merits of tradition, liberals place a premium on civil rights, 
multiculturalism, and egalitarianism (Jost, 2006). Differences 
between conservative and liberal ideologies are reflected in 
individuals’ attitudes (Jost, 2006), personalities (Carney et al., 2008), 
and moral judgments (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009; Haidt and 
Graham, 2007).  
Although political ideologies have long been understood to 
guide individuals’ behaviors as they relate to the political sphere 
(e.g., public policy preferences, voting, etc.), recent research 
suggests that ideologies likewise affect how corporate elites 
approach their job responsibilities (Chin et al., 2013; Francia, 2005; 
 
2 We use “conservatives” and “liberals” as shorthand terms for individuals with 
conservative-leaning and liberal-leaning ideologies, respectively. We similarly refer to 
conservative-leaning boards as “conservative boards” and liberal-leaning boards as “liberal 
boards.” As we will discuss later, though, directors and boards can espouse ideologies at 
any point on the conservatism-liberalism continuum. 
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Tetlock, 2000). In shaping these work-related decisions, political 
ideologies act as interpretive lenses which lead corporate executives 
to not only prefer courses of action that are consistent with their 
ideological worldviews, but also to fundamentally shape their 
reasoning in a way that they see instrumental merits in choices that 
align with their ideologies (Kunda, 1991; Gupta et al., 2017). For 
example, Chin and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that liberal 
CEOs exhibited greater engagement in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) than did conservative CEOs. Chin and 
Semadeni (2017) found that firms headed by conservative CEOs (as 
compared to liberal CEOs) tended to have higher pay dispersion 
among non-CEO top management team (TMT) members, and 
Christensen and colleagues (2015) illustrated that conservative 
CEOs were less likely to engage in tax avoidance than were liberal 
CEOs. In perhaps the most relevant precedent for our own study, 
Gupta and Wowak (2017) found that conservative boards tended to 
pay CEOs more while also tying CEO pay more closely to firm 
performance.  
This stream of research collectively illustrates that ideologies 
shape executives’ and directors’ decisions about firms’ strategic 
 106 
actions and governance initiatives. Still unexplored, however, is the 
role of board ideology in determining who is selected as the CEO in 
the first place. This absence of attention is part of a broader blind 
spot in the upper echelons literature regarding factors that influence 
the sorting of executives into their positions (Wowak et al., 2017), an 
oversight that we aim to address in our arguments below.   
4.2.4    Board conservatism and incoming CEO masculinity 
Scholars and practitioners alike have long recognized that 
managing the various threats facing the firm is vital to continued 
success. For instance, classic research in strategy suggests that the 
firm’s fate is inextricably tied to prevailing structural conditions such 
as the bargaining power of buyers and suppliers, the intensity of 
interfirm competition, and so on (Porter, 1980; Porter, 2008). Threats 
to firm success can also hinge upon more socially constituted factors 
such as status, reputation, and legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011; George 
et al., 2016; Harrison et al., 2018), as well as the obvious pitfalls that 
often accompany risky strategic initiatives such as overseas 
acquisitions (Cuervo-Cazurra, Maloney, and Manrakhan, 2007).  
Finding ways to mitigate the threats facing the firm is a 
primary concern for directors, not only because of their formal 
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responsibility to create value for the firm’s shareholders, but also 
because their livelihoods depend on it. While executives manage 
threats on a daily basis via the strategic choices that they make, 
boards of directors have fewer and more indirect avenues through 
which to manage these threats (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). 
Thus, the ability to choose who becomes CEO, which (as mentioned 
earlier) can have a profound impact on firm success and failure, is 
perhaps the most powerful lever at the board’s disposal. 
Research in political psychology has long held that individuals 
vary in how attentive they are to threats as a function of their political 
conservatism (Duckitt, 2001; Jost et al., 2003; 2007), and that this 
tendency translates to greater willingness to take actions to address 
these threats (Holbrook et al., 2016). For example, conservatives 
have a greater tendency to ascribe to “competitive jungle” and 
“dangerous-world” beliefs about their social environment (Federico, 
Hunt, and Ergun, 2009). This is consistent with Fessler, Pisor, and 
Holbrook’s (2017) finding that conservatives are more likely to 
believe information of uncertain veracity about threats than liberals. 
And research on facial evaluations has shown that conservatives 
have a greater tendency to interpret ambiguous facial expressions 
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as displaying threatening emotions (Vigil, 2010). Growing research 
suggests that conservatives’ heightened sensitivity to threat has 
detectable physical manifestations. When faced with threatening 
stimuli, conservatives have greater skin reactions, display more 
startle blinks, and direct more visual attention than liberals (Carraro, 
Castelli, and Macchielle, 2011; Dodd et al., 2012; Mclean et al., 
2014; Oxley et al., 2008). Kanai et al. (2011) found that 
conservatives tend to possess larger brain regions associated with 
the processing of threat cues, suggesting that there are neural bases 
for conservatives’ greater sensitivity to threat. To be clear, these 
studies do not indicate that either conservatives or liberals are more 
accurate in their assessment of actual threat – instead, they suggest 
that conservatives tend to be more motivated to attend to threat cues 
than liberals.   
Building on these ideas, we contend that conservative boards 
will be relatively more attentive to potential threats to the firm’s future 
success and survival, a result of which will be a stronger activation of 
evolutionary leadership biases in favor of more masculine 
individuals. Therefore, we expect that as board conservatism 
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increases, so too will the masculinity of the incoming CEO. 
Accordingly: 
Hypothesis 1: The more conservative the board, the more 
masculine the incoming CEO. 
4.2.5    The moderating influence of contextual threats 
So far, we have argued that conservative-leaning boards will 
evidence a greater preference for masculine CEOs because these 
boards are more sensitive to potential threats facing the firm. At the 
same time, differences between conservative and liberal boards with 
respect to perceptions of threat are likely to depend on the extent to 
which contextual conditions actually connote peril. In this section, we 
focus on two distinct sources of contextual threat that are likely to 
shape the baseline relationship hypothesized above: the degree to 
which the firm has recently performed well (versus poorly); and the 
degree to which the firm’s industry has been experiencing rapid 
(versus slow) growth. Examining these two factors allows us to shine 
a more focused spotlight on threat perceptions, our primary 
theorized mechanism linking board ideology and CEO masculinity. 
A firm’s financial performance offers an objective barometer 
of the firm’s overall health, which is naturally top-of-mind for directors 
 110 
(Boivie, Graffin, and Pollock, 2012; Vafeas, 1999). When firm 
performance is high, there is relatively less information that can be 
interpreted as potentially threatening. Conservative and liberal 
directors alike will perceive lower levels of threat in such situations, 
which should in turn diminish the effect of board conservatism on 
incoming CEO masculinity. In other words, good firm performance 
will cause all directors to feel better about their firms’ future 
prospects, which will diminish the tendency - more pronounced in 
conservatives than in liberals - toward more masculine leaders. 
When firm performance is poor, the firm is unable to deliver 
value to its shareholders, the likelihood of layoffs rises, and there are 
increased calls for changes in the firm’s leadership (Finkelstein, 
Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). The business press is replete with 
examples of boards that were replaced during times of poor firm 
performance. Because of increased threats to the firm and to 
directors’ livelihood, that accompany poor firm performance, 
conservative directors, who are more sensitive to threats, will exhibit 
an even greater preference for masculine CEOs. Thus:  
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Hypothesis 2: The better the firm’s recent performance, the 
less positive the relationship between board conservatism 
and incoming CEO masculinity. 
  
In addition to firm performance, we posit that industrywide 
resource constraints (or the lack thereof) will play an important role 
in moderating the influence of board political ideology on incoming 
CEO masculinity. An abundance of research suggests that a firm’s 
vitality is in part a function of the overall industry environment 
(McGahan and Porter, 1997; Short et al., 2003), with firms in slow-
growth industries facing steeper challenges than their counterparts 
in more rapidly growing industries. As such, industry conditions 
naturally influence corporate leaders’ cognitions and behaviors 
(Abrahamson and Hambrick, 1997; Hambrick and Abrahamson, 
1995).  
Industry munificence, defined as “the extent to which the 
environment can support sustained growth,” (Starbuck, 1976) refers 
to the general trajectory of an industry (Dess and Beard, 1984). 
When industry munificence is high, directors will generally perceive 
more growth opportunities and, as consequence, relatively lower 
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levels of threat. The converse should be true in a slow-growth 
industry, as the lack of growth opportunities will tend to raise the 
level of threat perceived by directors. We thus propose that board 
ideology will have a stronger effect on incoming CEO masculinity in 
the latter (slow-growth industries) than in the former (high-growth 
industries), as the objectively higher level of threat in slow-growth 
industries will be particularly salient to conservative boards that are 
already closely attuned to threat. As such: 
Hypothesis 3: The more munificent the industry, the less 
positive the relationship between board conservatism and 
incoming CEO masculinity. 
 
4.3    Methods 
 
4.3.1    Sample and data sources 
We tested our hypotheses on a sample consisting of CEO 
succession events in S&P 1500 firms from 2007 to 2013. As we 
discuss below, we computed facial masculinity from pictures of 
executives gathered from company websites and the business 
press, and computed vocal masculinity from audio clips gathered 
from CEO presentations, interviews with the business press, and 
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earnings calls with financial analysts. We measured political ideology 
by collecting individual donation data for members of the board of 
directors from the FEC (Federal Election Commission) (e.g., Chin et 
al., 2013; Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick, 2017; Gupta and Wowak, 
2017). For the other variables, financial data was collected from 
Compustat, stock market data was collected from the Center for 
Research in Security Princes (CRSP), and information on the CEO 
and the board were collected from Institutional Shareholder Services 
(ISS).    
Because masculine physiological features are more important 
in shaping the evaluations of males than females (Sell et al., 2009; 
Sell et al., 2010), in conjunction with the fact that there were 
relatively few female incoming CEOs in our sample, we focused 
solely on male CEOs. However, the results were substantively 
similar when including female CEOs in our analysis. After accounting 
for missing masculinity data for incoming CEOs and outgoing CEOs, 
our final sample comprised 528 succession events.  
4.3.2    Dependent variables 
CEO masculinity. We assessed CEO masculinity using two 
distinct measures. The first of these, the facial masculinity of the 
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incoming CEO, was captured by computing the lower face to face 
height ratio of their faces. Multiple studies have found that the lower 
face to face height ratio exhibits sexual dimorphism: it is significantly 
higher for males than females, and this gendered association with 
masculinity strongly predicts within-group differences among males 
(e.g., Lefevre et al., 2012; Penton Voak et al., 2001). 
We were selective in choosing pictures, making sure that they 
were forward facing with minimal head tilt. The collected pictures 
were cropped around the CEOs’ faces and converted to 8-bit 
grayscale images with a standardized height of 400 pixels (e.g., 
Carré et al., 2009). We measured the two facial metrics required to 
compute the lower face to face height ratio – lower face height and 
total face height – using the NIH ImageJ software. Lower face height 
was measured as the vertical distance from the height of the eyes to 
the bottom of the chin, and total face height was measured as the 
vertical distance from the top of the forehead to the bottom of the 
chin (Lefevre et al., 2012; Penton Voak et al., 2001). 
Our second measure, vocal masculinity of the incoming 
CEO, was measured using the formant dispersion of the CEO’s 
voice. Formant dispersion, a widely accepted measure of vocal 
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masculinity in the evolutionary sciences, is defined as the average 
“dispersion” or spacing between the formants of a speaker’s voice 
and influences the perceived “deepness” or “lowness” of the voice 
(Puts et al., 2014; Puts, Gaulin, and Verdolini, 2006; Wolff and Puts, 
2010). Formants are a measure of the resonance quality of speech 
and capture low impedance, or in other words, the frequencies 
where the voice of the speaker vibrates the least (Hodges-Simeon, 
Gaulin, and Puts, 2010; Puts et al., 2006). Formant dispersion is a 
stable characteristic of the speaker and is extremely difficult to 
modulate (Fitch, 1997). Once an individual reaches adulthood, it is 
largely unaffected by age, social rank, or voice coaching (Evans, 
Neave, and Wakelin, 2006; Ko, Sadler, and Galinsky, 2014). For 
example, when the former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, 
underwent voice coaching, her formant dispersion remained the 
same even as other parameters of her voice changed (Ko, Sadler, 
and Galinsky, 2014). Given that formant dispersion is inversely 
related to vocal masculinity (Puts et al., 2014), the sign of the 
formant dispersion values was reversed to compute our vocal 
masculinity measure.  
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The log function of the Praat 64-bit audio software was used 
to measure CEO vocal masculinity. Consistent with the literature, we 
used 20-second audio clips of CEO speech (Nair and Haque, 2016; 
Mayew et al., 2013). To assess the robustness of the vocal 
masculinity measure to different clip lengths, we compared these 20-
second audio clips with 45-second audio clips for a random 
subsample of 100 incoming CEOs. The correlation between the 
formant dispersion measures of these clips was very high (r=0.989, 
p<0.001), suggesting that using 20-second clips was appropriate. 
The formula used to compute formant dispersion is: 
 
Here, n refers to the total number of measured formant frequencies 
and F refers to the specific formants: F1, F2, F3, and F4. We 
standardized the values of the facial masculinity and vocal 
masculinity variables to allow for a more straightforward 
interpretation of regression results.  
4.3.3    Independent variables 
Board political ideology. Following prior research, board 
ideology was measured by compiling data on political donations by 
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individual directors to the two major US parties (e.g., Chin et al., 
2013; Gupta and Wowak, 2017; Gupta, Briscoe, and Hambrick, 
2017). Political donations of over $200 to individual political 
candidates, political action committees, federal office campaign 
committees, and national parties are publicly available from the 
FEC’s website (Chin, Hambrick, and Trevino, 2013). The political 
science literature has shown that support for the Republican Party, 
which espouses conservative beliefs, and the Democratic Party, 
which espouses liberal beliefs, reflect stable political ideological 
differences (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984; Goren, Federico, and 
Kittilson, 2009). Thus, the choice to donate to one party over another 
is indicative of individual differences in political ideology.     
Data on the political donations of individual directors was 
collected using the probabilistic linkage procedure outlined by Gupta 
and Wowak (2017). We measured the ideology of individual 
directors using the index introduced by Chin, Hambrick, and Trevino 
(2013). This index consisted of four components: 1) the number of 
donations to the Republican Party divided by donations to both the 
Republican and Democratic Parties; 2) the dollar amounts of 
donations to the Republican Party divided by dollar amounts of 
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donations to both the Republican and Democratic Parties; 3) the 
number of distinct years in which the individual contributed to the 
Republican party divided by the number of distinct years in which the 
executive contributed to both the Republican and Democratic 
Parties, and 4) the number of distinct Republican recipients of 
donations divided by the total number of distinct Republican and 
Democratic recipients (Chin, Hambrick, and Trevino, 2013). 
Consistent with the assumption that political beliefs are very stable 
over time (Sears and Funk, 1999; Burris, 2001; Jost, 2006), we 
utilized all political donations made by individual directors in 
computing the index (Gupta and Wowak, 2017). Finally, board 
political conservatism was computed by averaging the conservatism 
scores for individual directors on the board of the focal firm in the 
year prior to the appointment of the new CEO. However, using the 
board conservatism for the succession year produced highly 
consistent results. 
4.3.4    Moderating variables  
Financial performance. We measured financial performance 
using total shareholder returns (TSR), a widely recognized 
performance metric that is closely monitored by directors and 
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shareholders (Connelly et al., in press). TSR was computed as the 
monthly compounded returns to shareholders (assuming the 
continuous reinvestment of dividends) for the prior fiscal year.  
Industry munificence. Industry munificence was measured 
following the method outlined in Dess and Beard (1984), which 
involved regressing total industry sales on the trailing five years and 
subsequently dividing the regression slope coefficient by average 
sales over the same time period. 
4.3.5    Control variables 
There is limited research on CEO masculinity in the corporate 
governance literature, which somewhat complicates the selection of 
control variables. We nevertheless included a comprehensive array 
of controls to help rule out alternative influences on our dependent 
variables. At the firm level, we controlled for firm size (net sales, log 
transformed to correct for skew) and firm accounting performance 
(return on assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets). 
We also controlled for industry dynamism, calculated using the Dess 
and Beard (1984) method. At the board level, we included measures 
of board size and number of independent directors. To help account 
for the potential influence of other incoming CEO characteristics, we 
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controlled for CEO age, CEO racial minority status (a dummy 
variable coded as 1 if the incoming CEO is not Caucasian), and 
CEO conservatism (same method as that used for computing the 
ideology of individual directors). We likewise controlled for 
characteristics of the outgoing CEO, including predecessor facial 
and vocal masculinity (measured as described above) and 
predecessor conservatism. All control variables were measured the 
year prior to the appointment of the new CEO.     
4.3.6    Estimation method and endogeneity 
Because each CEO appears only once in our analysis, we 
used ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to test our 
hypotheses. Three different sets of regressions were run: Models 1 
through 5 predict the facial masculinity of the incoming CEO; Models 
6 through 10 predict the vocal masculinity of the incoming CEO; and 
Models 11 through 15 predict the overall masculinity of the incoming 
CEO (computed as the average of the [standardized] values for the 
facial masculinity and vocal masculinity variables). As a point of 
clarification, we controlled for the facial masculinity of the incoming 
CEO in the regressions predicting the vocal masculinity of the 
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incoming CEO, and for vocal masculinity of the incoming CEO in the 
regressions predicting the facial masculinity of the incoming CEO. 
To improve approximation of causality, we performed 
additional analyses to assess the sensitivity of our results to 
concerns about endogeneity. In our context, endogeneity concerns 
can take two major forms: reverse causality and omitted variable 
bias. Reverse causality would imply that our independent variable – 
board political ideology – is caused by our dependent variable(s) – 
CEO facial masculinity and CEO vocal masculinity. We aimed to 
mitigate this concern by following the time-honored principle of 
temporal precedence: we ensured that our key independent 
variables were measured in the year prior to our dependent variable, 
e.g. board political ideology in year prior to succession predicts 
incoming CEO masculinity in the succession year.   
Omitted variable bias would occur if some unobserved 
variable influences both our board political ideology and CEO 
masculinity variables, thereby causing spurious association between 
them. While only a randomized experiment can fully rule out omitted 
variable bias, we ran supplemental models using two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression, which represents the best practice for 
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mitigating such concerns in strategic management research 
(Semadeni, Withers, and Certo, 2013). This approach involved 
adding all of our first predictors in the main models to the first-stage 
equation, as well as selecting two exogenous instrument variables. 
Based on the idea that board political ideology is influenced in part 
by supply side factors, we entered: (1) the average conservatism 
level of directors in the focal firm’s 4-digit GICS industry, and (2) the 
conservatism level of the headquarter state, measured using the 
voting data from the most recent presidential election. The two 
variables were significantly predictive of board ideology (p<.01, 
F=23.27), but have no direct effect on the masculinity of the 
incoming CEO. These analyses yielded results that are highly similar 
to those reported in Tables 2 and 3, such that the instrumented 
version of the board conservatism measure was a significant 
predictor across all models. Additionally, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test did not call for rejection of the null hypothesis that board 
conservatism was exogenous (p=.34), suggesting that omitted 
variable bias was not a major concern in our sample.  
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4.4    Results 
 
Variable intercorrelations, means, and standard deviations 
are reported in Table 1. Tables 2 through 4 present the 15 models 
we ran to test our hypotheses. Consistent with prior work which finds 
that facial and vocal masculinity provide independent information 
about formidability and masculinity (Sell et al., 2010), our facial and 
vocal masculinity indicators are uncorrelated with each other.  
Model 1, 6, and 11 are the baseline models and include only 
the control and moderating variables. The control variables are 
generally insignificant predictors of masculinity with the exception of 
outgoing CEO facial masculinity in predicting incoming CEO facial 
masculinity, and outgoing CEO vocal masculinity in predicting 
incoming CEO vocal masculinity. Model 2, 7, and 12 add our 
explanatory variable, board political conservatism. Model 3, 8, and 
13 introduce the interaction term associated with TSR, and Model 4, 
9 and 14 introduce the interaction term associated with industry 
munificence. Finally, Model 5, 10, and 15 include the full model with 
both interaction terms.     
---- Insert Tables 1 through 4 here ---- 
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Hypothesis 1 proposes that conservative boards have a 
greater preference for masculine CEOs because conservative 
boards are more sensitive to cues of threat. We find strong support 
for Hypothesis 1 across all models in which the board conservatism 
variable was included (2-5, 7-10, and 12-15).      
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 refer to the moderating effect 
of firm performance and industry munificence, respectively, on the 
board political conservatism-incoming CEO masculinity relationship. 
We argued that when the threat and uncertainty facing the firm is 
high because of poor firm performance (H2) or low industry 
munificence (H3), the preference of conservative directors for 
masculine CEOs will be even stronger. We find support for H2. The 
prediction for H2 is significant and has the expected sign across all 
models (3, 5, 8, 10, 13, and 15). The prediction for H3 is significant 
and has the right sign in the regressions predicting the facial 
masculinity of the incoming CEO (model 4 and 5) but not in the 
regressions predicting the vocal masculinity and overall masculinity 
of the incoming CEO. The interaction plots (Figures 1 through 4) 
display the significant interactions graphically.   
[Insert Figures 1 through 4 here] 
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In addition to passing the test of statistical significance, our 
predictors were also meaningful in terms of effect sizes. In models 
predicting facial masculinity, difference between liberal-leaning (-1 S. 
D.) and conservative-leaning boards corresponded to approximately 
four tenth of a standard deviation change in both facial and vocal 
masculinity, as well as in our composite masculinity index. For facial 
masculinity, this difference increased to six tenth of a standard 
deviation when the firm exhibited poor stock performance (-1 S.D.), 
or when the industry had low munificence (-1 S.D.). Similarly, for 
vocal masculinity, liberal and conservative boards corresponded to 
six tenth of a standard deviation when the firm had poor stock 
performance. In sum, our independent variables were substantively 
important predictors of the masculinity of the incoming CEO. 
4.5    Discussion 
 
4.5.1    Contributions 
Our study set out to examine how board political ideology 
influences the selection of more (versus less) masculine CEOs. 
Recent research has found that CEO masculinity shapes a variety of 
organizational outcomes, including CEO compensation (Mayew et 
al., 2013; Nair and Haque, 2016), financial misreporting (Jia et al., 
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2014), and firm performance (Joshi et al., 2017). Using insights from 
research on evolutionary psychology, political ideology, and 
behavioral corporate governance, we theorized that because the 
preference for masculine leaders is driven by perceptions of threat, 
and because conservative directors are likely to have higher 
sensitivities to threat, conservative boards would show a stronger 
preference for masculine CEOs. We further argued that this 
relationship would be more pronounced in situations where the focal 
firm faced difficult conditions, specifically poor recent performance 
and slow industry growth. As discussed above, our results are 
broadly consistent with these predictions.  
 We make three major contributions in our study. First, we 
contribute to the CEO succession literature by addressing the 
question: Why do CEOs look the way they do? While the puzzle 
regarding why some individuals are more likely to attain leadership 
positions than others has long been of interest to management 
scholars (Bass and Stogdill, 1990; Eagly and Karau, 1991), we still 
know surprisingly little about how CEOs are sorted into specific firms 
(Hambrick, 2007; Wowak et al., 2017). The traditional view has been 
that CEOs are matched to firms based on the fit between executive 
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skills and the needs of the firm (Chen and Hambrick, 2012; Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 1984; Hambrick and Crozier, 1985). Thus, when 
the needs of the firm change, the characteristics of the appointed 
CEO also change. However, several studies have shown that 
directors are influenced by cognitive biases during the CEO 
selection process (Khurana, 2002; Zajac and Westphal, 1996), 
suggesting that CEO hiring decisions could also be driven by non-
economic factors. By showing that the political ideologies of directors 
affect the extent to which boards gravitate towards masculine CEOs, 
our research shows that CEO selection decisions are motivated not 
only by the needs of the firms, but also by the idiosyncratic 
preferences of directors.  
  Second, we contribute to the growing literature on diversity in 
the corporate elite, which (with some exceptions) has been mostly 
limited to discussions of gender, race, and social class. This 
research, mostly conducted in Western societies, has shown that 
executives who are upper-class, Caucasian, and male enjoy a 
number of privileges, including higher compensation levels (Fiss, 
2006; Kulich et al., 2011), greater upward job mobility (Maclean, 
Harvey, and Kling, 2014; Westphal and Stern, 2007; Stern and 
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Westphal, 2010), and lower accountability for poor firm performance 
(Park and Westphal, 2013). We add to this burgeoning domain by 
providing evidence that differences in masculinity can serve as a 
source of discrimination – even among those commonly assumed to 
sit at the apex of the corporate elite. Current theorizing and empirical 
evidence suggest that the existence of the masculinity bias is cross-
cultural in nature (Petersen, 2015) but is magnified by evaluators’ 
perceptions of threats in the environment (Little et al., 2007; Spisak 
et al., 2012; Tigue et al., 2012). By examining how the political 
conservatism of the board, a variable tracking directors’ threat 
sensitivity, influences the preference for masculine CEOs, we 
highlight the salient role of political ideology in shaping diversity-
related outcomes (Briscoe and Joshi, 2017; Carnahan and 
Greenwood, 2018). 
Third, we contribute to implicit leadership theory by providing 
evidence of individual variations in preferences for evolutionary 
leadership prototypes. While implicit leadership theory has 
traditionally assumed that leadership prototypes are created through 
socialization and personal experience (Javidan et al., 2006), more 
recent research has recognized that some of these prototypes have 
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deep evolutionary origins (Junker and Dick, 2014; Petersen, 2015; 
Spisak et al., 2012; Van Vugt and Ronay, 2013). Existing research in 
this area has tended to focus on situational conditions that activate 
evolutionary leadership prototypes. For example, the masculinity 
bias is more apparent in the presence of threatening conditions such 
as high intergroup competition (e.g., Little et al., 2007; Spisak et al., 
2012; Tigue et al., 2012). However, individuals vary in how sensitive 
they are to threats in the environment (e.g., Federico et al., 2009; 
Fessler et al., 2017). Our results are consistent with the notion that 
conservative directors’ heightened sensitivity to threat predisposes 
them toward leaders with more masculine features. While 
evolutionary scientists going all the way back to Charles Darwin 
(1859) have highlighted the importance of studying individual 
differences in evolutionarily adaptive traits, their implications for 
leadership outcomes – including CEO selection – has remained 
largely unexplored.  
4.5.2    Limitations and future research 
 Our research has several limitations that present 
opportunities for future research. First, our study focused on 
examining the role of CEO masculinity in shaping the board’s CEO 
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selection decisions. However, we can readily envision that CEO 
masculinity will influence CEO evaluations by other stakeholder 
groups as well, including shareholders, journalists, and financial 
analysts. Our study suggests that these effects might hinge on the 
political ideology of evaluators. Given that these audiences play a 
key role in CEO career outcomes, future studies exploring this idea 
could shed even more light on the role of CEO masculinity in 
brightening (or dimming) the career prospects of top executives.   
Second, we focused only on male incoming CEOs in our 
study because masculine physiological features are more important 
in influencing the perceptions of male targets (Sell et al., 2009; Sell 
et al., 2010) and, more practically, because there were too few 
female incoming CEOs in our study population to accurately model. 
Existing research has highlighted that unlike masculine males, who 
are rated by observers as both more leaderlike and more attractive, 
masculine females are rated as more leaderlike, but less attractive 
(Puts et al., 2014; Klofstad et al., 2016). In light of the unique 
tradeoff that females seem to face between masculinity and 
attractiveness, studying the role of female CEO attractiveness and 
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masculinity concurrently in CEO selection decisions could be an 
interesting avenue for future inquiry.  
Third, our study was conducted in the U.S. context and may 
not be generalizable to other national contexts. For instance, 
directors in countries with weaker political and economic institutions 
could be more likely to believe that they live in a “competitive jungle” 
or “dog-eat-dog” world, and hence be more vigilant to threats. 
Accordingly, they might evidence a stronger overall preference for 
masculine leaders than directors living in the US. As images and 
audio clips become more widely available for CEOs across different 
countries, scholars could examine the extent to which national 
context matters for our theorized relationships.  
4.6    Conclusion 
 
The hiring of a CEO is unquestionably one of the board’s 
most important responsibilities, yet surprisingly little is known about 
why CEOs look the way they do. Integrating insights from several 
academic fields, our theory and findings illustrate that directors’ 
personal beliefs, and specifically their political ideologies, influence 
the characteristics that they look for in a CEO. By offering evidence 
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that directors’ ideologies help shape their idealized notions of 
leadership, we offer a new vantage on CEO succession that can 
likewise inform research on diversity in the corporate elite and 
implicit leadership theory.  
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4.7.2    Table 2. OLS models predicting facial masculinity of 
incoming CEOs 
 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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4.7.3    Table 3. OLS models predicting vocal masculinity of 
incoming CEOs 
 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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4.7.4    Table 4. OLS models predicting masculinity index of 
incoming CEOs 
 
+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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4.7.5    Figure 1. The effect of board conservatism on the facial 
masculinity of the incoming CEO – under high versus low stock 
performance 
 
 
4.7.6    Figure 2. The effect of board conservatism on the facial 
masculinity of the incoming CEO – under high versus low 
industry munificence 
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4.7.7    Figure 3. The effect of board conservatism on the vocal 
masculinity of the incoming CEO – under high versus low stock 
performance 
 
4.7.8    Figure 4. The effect of board conservatism on the overall 
masculinity (composite of vocal and facial masculinity) of the 
incoming CEO – under high versus low stock performance 
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González J.  
2004 “Formant frequencies and body size of speaker: a weak 
relationship in adult humans.” Journal of Phonetics 32: 277-287. 
 
Goodwin, G. P., Piazza, J., & Rozin, P.  
2014 “Moral character predominates in person perception and 
evaluation.” Journal of personality and social psychology, 106: 148. 
 
George, G., Dahlander, L., Graffin, S. D., and Sim, S.  
2016 “Reputation and status: Expanding the role of social 
evaluations in management research.” Academy of Management 
Journal, 59: 1-13.  
 
Goren, P., Federico, C. M., and Kittilson, M. C.  
2009 “Source cues, partisan identities, and political value 
expression.” American Journal of Political Science, 53: 805-820.  
 
Graffin, S. D., Boivie, S., and Carpenter, M. A.  
2013 “Examining CEO succession and the role of heuristics in 
early‐stage CEO evaluation.” Strategic Management Journal, 34: 
383-403.  
 
 
 
Graffin, S. D., Wade, J. B., Porac, J. F., and McNamee, R. C.  
2008 “The impact of CEO status diffusion on the economic 
outcomes of other senior managers.” Organization Science, 19: 457-
474. 
 
Graham, J., Haidt, J., and Nosek, B. A.  
2009 “Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral 
foundations.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96: 
1029-1046. 
 
Groysberg, B., McLean, A. N., and Nohria, N.  
 154 
2006 “Are leaders portable?” Harvard Business Review, 84(5): 92-
100.  
 
Gupta, A., Briscoe, F., and Hambrick, D. C.  
2017 “Red, blue, and purple firms: Organizational political ideology 
and corporate social responsibility.” Strategic Management 
Journal, 38: 1018-1040.  
 
Gupta, A., and Misangyi, V. F.  
2018 “Follow the leader (or not): The influence of peer CEOs’ 
characteristics on interorganizational imitation.” Strategic 
Management Journal, 39: 1437-1472. 
 
Gupta, A., and Wowak, A. J.  
2017 “The Elephant (or Donkey) in the Boardroom: How Board 
Political Ideology Affects CEO Pay.” Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 62: 1-30.  
 
Gupta, A. K., and Govindarajan, V.  
1984 “Business unit strategy, managerial characteristics, and 
business unit effectiveness at strategy implementation.” Academy of 
Management Journal, 27: 25-41. 
 
Haidt, J., and Graham, J.  
2007 “When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral 
intuitions that liberals may not recognize.” Social Justice 
Research, 20: 98-116.  
 
Hambrick, D. C.  
2007 “Upper echelons theory: An update.” Academy of Management 
Review, 32: 334-343. 
  
Hambrick, D. C., and Crozier, L. M.  
1985 “Stumblers and stars in the management of rapid growth.” 
Journal of Business Venturing, 1: 31-45. 
 
Hambrick, D. C., and Abrahamson, E.  
 155 
1995 “Assessing managerial discretion across industries: A 
multimethod approach.” Academy of Management Journal, 38: 
1427-1441. 
 
Hambrick, D. C., & Crozier, L. M. 
1985 “Stumblers and stars in the management of rapid 
growth.” Journal of Business Venturing, 1: 31-45.  
 
Hambrick, D. C., and Finkelstein, S.  
1987 “Managerial discretion: A bridge between polar views of 
organizational outcomes.” Research in Organizational Behavior. 
 
Hambrick DC, Finkelstein S.  
1995 “The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: the 
case of CEO pay raises.” Strategic Management Journal, 16: 175-
193. 
 
Hambrick, D. C., and Mason, P. A.  
1984 “Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top 
managers.” Academy of Management Review, 9: 193-206.  
 
Hambrick, D. C., and Quigley, T. J.  
2014 “Toward more accurate contextualization of the CEO effect on 
firm performance.” Strategic Management Journal, 35: 473-491. 
 
Hammerstein, P., and Parker, G. A.  
1982 “The asymmetric war of attrition.” Journal of Theoretical 
Biology, 96: 647-682.  
 
Harrison, J. S., Boivie, S., Sharp, N. Y., and Gentry, R. J.  
2018 “Saving face: How exit in response to negative press and star 
analyst downgrades reflects reputation maintenance by 
directors.” Academy of Management Journal, 61: 1131-1157.   
 
Haselhuhn, M. P., & Wong, E. M.  
2011 “Bad to the bone: facial structure predicts unethical 
behaviour.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: 
Biological Sciences, rspb20111193. 
 
 156 
Haselton MG, Nettle D, Murray D.  
2015 “The evolution of cognitive bias.” In The Handbook of 
Evolutionary Psychology (Eds.), Buss DM. Wiley: Hoboken; 968-
987. 
 
Haynes KT, Hillman A.  
2010 “The effect of board capital and CEO power on strategic 
change.” Strategic Management Journal 31: 1145–1163. 
 
Hayward ML, Rindova VP, Pollock TG.  
2004 “Believing one's own press: the causes and consequences of 
CEO celebrity.” Strategic Management Journal 25: 637-653. 
 
Heckman JJ.  
1979 “Sample selection bias as a specification error.” Econometrica 
47: 153-161. 
 
Hill CW, Phan P.  
1991 “CEO tenure as a determinant of CEO pay.” Academy of 
Management Journal  
34: 707-717. 
 
Hodges-Simeon, C. R., Gaulin, S. J., and Puts, D. A.  
2010 “Different vocal parameters predict perceptions of dominance 
and attractiveness.” Human Nature, 21: 406-427. 
 
Holbrook, C., López-Rodríguez, L., Fessler, D. M., Vázquez, A., and 
Gómez, Á.  
2016 “Gulliver’s politics: Conservatives envision potential enemies 
as readily vanquished and physically small.” Social Psychological 
and Personality Science, 8: 670-678.  
 
Holderness CG.  
2003 “A survey of blockholders and corporate control.” Economic 
Policy Review 9: 51-63. 
 
Holmstrom, B.  
1982 “Moral hazard in teams.” The Bell Journal of Economics, 13: 
324-340. 
 157 
 
Huang D, Kisgen DJ.  
2013 “Gender and corporate finance: are male executives 
overconfident relative to female executives?” Journal of Financial 
Economics 108: 822-839. 
 
Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., De Luque, M. S., and House, R. J.  
2006 “In the eye of the beholder: Cross cultural lessons in leadership 
from Project GLOBE.” Academy of Management Perspectives, 20: 
67-90.  
 
Jia, Y., Lent, L. V., and Zeng, Y.  
2014 “Masculinity, testosterone, and financial misreporting.” Journal 
of Accounting Research, 52: 1195-1246.  
 
Jones BC et al. 
2010 “A domain-specific opposite-sex bias in human preferences for 
manipulated voice  
Pitch.” Animal Behaviour 79: 57-62. 
 
Joshi, A., Misangyi, V.F., Neeley, B., and Rizzi, A.  
2017 “Does the Masculinity of Male CEOs Predict CEO Pay and 
Firm Performance?” Academy of Management 2017 Annual 
Meeting. Show Case Symposium Presentation.   
 
Jost, J. T.  
2006 “The end of the end of ideology.” American Psychologist, 61: 
651-670. 
 
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., and Sulloway, F. J.  
2003 “Political conservatism as motivated social 
cognition.” Psychological bulletin, 129: 339.  
 
Jost, J. T., Napier, J. L., Thorisdottir, H., Gosling, S. D., Palfai, T. P., 
and Ostafin, B.  
2007 “Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with 
political conservatism or ideological extremity?” Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 33: 989-1007.  
 
 158 
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., and Napier, J. L.  
2009 “Political ideology: Its structure, functions, and elective 
affinities.” Annual Review of Psychology, 60: 307-337.  
 
Junker, N. M., and van Dick, R.  
2014 “Implicit theories in organizational settings: A systematic review 
and research agenda of implicit leadership and followership 
theories.” The Leadership Quarterly, 25: 1154-1173. 
 
Kahneman D.  
2003 “A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded 
rationality.” American Psychologist, 58: 697-720. 
 
Kalyta P.  
2009 “Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism: a 
study of supplemental retirement plans.” Strategic Management 
Journal 30: 405-423. 
 
Kanai, R., Bahrami, B., Roylance, R., and Rees, G.  
2011 “Online social network size is reflected in human brain 
structure.” In Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 279. 
 
Kaplan, S. N., and Minton, B. A.  
2012 “How has CEO turnover changed?” International Review of 
Finance, 12: 57-87. 
 
Kenrick et al.  
2010 “Renovating the pyramid of needs: contemporary extensions 
built upon ancient  
foundations”. Perspectives on Psychological Science 5: 292-314. 
 
Kim JW, Kogut B, Yang J.  
2015 “Executive compensation, fat cats, and best athletes.” 
American Sociological Review 80: 299-328. 
 
Kunda, Z.  
1990 “The case for motivated reasoning.” Psychological 
bulletin, 108: 480.  
 
 159 
Khurana, R. 
2002 “Searching for a Corporate Savior: The Irrational Quest for 
Charismatic CEOs.” Princeton University Press. 
 
Klofstad, C. A.  
2016 “Candidate voice pitch influences election outcomes.” Political 
Psychology, 37: 725-738. 
 
Klofstad, C. A., Anderson, R. C., and Peters, S.  
2012 “Sounds like a winner: voice pitch influences perception of 
leadership capacity in both men and women.” Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 279: 2698-2704.  
 
Klofstad, C. A., Nowicki, S., and Anderson, R. C.  
2016 “How Voice Pitch Influences Our Choice of Leaders.” American 
Scientist, 104: 282-287.  
 
Ko, S. J., Sadler, M. S., and Galinsky, A. D.  
2015 “The sound of power: Conveying and detecting hierarchical 
rank through voice.” Psychological Science, 26: 3-14. 
 
Kosinski, M.  
2017. “Facial width-to-height ratio does not predict self-reported 
behavioral tendencies.” Psychological science, 28: 1675-1682. 
 
Krause R, Filatotchev I, Bruton G.  
2015. “When in Rome, Look like Caesar? Investigating the link  
between demand-side cultural power distance and CEO power.” 
Academy of Management Journal 59: 1361-1384. 
 
Kulich, C., Trojanowski, G., Ryan, M. K., Alexander Haslam, S., and 
Renneboog, L. D.  
2011 “Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of 
gender disparities in executive remuneration.” Strategic 
Management Journal, 32: 301-321.  
 
Landsberg, R.  
2007. “Understanding the role of a corporate compensation 
committee.” Journal of  
 160 
Financial Service Professionals 61: 22-23. 
 
Lassek, W. D., and Gaulin, S. J.  
2009 “Costs and benefits of fat-free muscle mass in men: 
Relationship to mating success, dietary requirements, and native 
immunity.” Evolution and Human Behavior, 30: 322-328.  
 
 
 
Laustsen L, Petersen MB, Klofstad CA.  
2015. “Vote choice, ideology, and social dominance orientation 
influence preferences for lower pitched voices in political 
candidates.” Evolutionary Psychology 13: 1-13. 
 
Lefevre, C. E., & Lewis, G. J.  
2014. “Perceiving aggression from facial structure: Further evidence 
for a positive association with facial width‐to‐height ratio and 
masculinity, but not for moderation by self‐reported 
dominance.” European Journal of Personality, 28: 530-537. 
 
Lefevre, C. E., Lewis, G. J., Bates, T. C., Dzhelyova, M., Coetzee, 
V., Deary, I. J., and Perrett, D. I.  
2012 “No evidence for sexual dimorphism of facial width-to-height 
ratio in four large adult samples.” Evolution and Human Behavior, 
33: 623-627.  
 
Lefevre, C. E., Lewis, G. J., Perrett, D. I., & Penke, L.  
2013. “Telling facial metrics: facial width is associated with 
testosterone levels in men.” Evolution and Human Behavior, 34: 
273-279. 
 
Levi M, Li K, Zhang F.  
2014. “Director gender and mergers and acquisitions.” Journal of 
Corporate Finance 28: 185-200. 
 
Li, N. P., van Vugt, M., & Colarelli, S. M.  
2017. “The Evolutionary Mismatch Hypothesis: Implications for 
Psychological Science.” Current Directions in Psychological Science, 
0963721417731378. 
 161 
 
Little, Anthony C., Robert P. Burriss, Benedict C. Jones, and S. 
Craig Roberts.  
2007 "Facial appearance affects voting decisions." Evolution and 
Human Behavior, 28: 18-27.  
 
Little, A. C., Třebický, V., Havlíček, J., Roberts, S. C., and Kleisner, 
K.  
2015 “Human perception of fighting ability: facial cues predict 
winners and losers in mixed martial arts fights.” Behavioral 
Ecology, 26: 1470-1475. 
Lorsch, J. W. and MacIver, E.  
1989 “Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America’s Corporate 
Boards.” Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA. 
 
Lord, Robert G., and Karen J. Maher.  
2002 “Leadership and Information Processing: Linking Perceptions 
and Performance.” Routledge.  
 
Lukaszewski, A. W., Simmons, Z. L., Anderson, C., and Roney, J. R.  
2016 “The role of physical formidability in human social status 
allocation.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 110: 385-
406.  
 
Mackey, A.  
2008 “The effect of CEOs on firm performance.” Strategic 
Management Journal, 29: 1357-1367. 
 
Maclean, M., Harvey, C., and Kling, G.  
2014 “Pathways to power: Class, hyper-agency and the French 
corporate elite.” Organization Studies, 35: 825-855.  
 
Main BG, and Johnston J.  
1993 “Remuneration committee and corporate governance.” 
Accounting and Business Research 23: 351-362. 
 
Malhotra, S., Reus, T. H., Zhu, P., & Roelofsen, E. M.  
2017 “The acquisitive nature of extraverted CEOs.” Administrative 
Science Quarterly: 1-39. 
 162 
 
Manson JH, Wrangham RW.  
1991 “Intergroup aggression in chimpanzees and humans.” Current 
Anthropology, 32: 369–390.  
 
Markóczy L, Goldberg J.  
1998 “Management, organization and human nature: an 
introduction.” Managerial and Decision Economics 19: 387-409. 
 
Mayew, W. J., Parsons, C. A., and Venkatachalam, M.  
2013 “Voice pitch and the labor market success of male chief 
executive officers.” Evolution and Human Behavior, 34: 243-248. 
 
McDonald, M. M., Navarrete, C. D., and Van Vugt, M.  
2012 “Evolution and the psychology of intergroup conflict: The male 
warrior hypothesis.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
B, 367: 670-679. 
 
McGahan, A. M., and Porter, M. E.  
1997 “How much does industry matter, really?” Strategic 
management journal, 18: 15-30. 
 
McLean, S. P., Garza, J. P., Wiebe, S. A., Dodd, M. D., Smith, K. B., 
Hibbing, J. R., and Espy, K. A.  
2014 Applying the flanker task to political psychology: A research 
note. Political Psychology, 35: 831-840. 
 
Meindl JR, Ehrlich SB, Dukerich JM.  
1985 “The romance of leadership.” Administrative Science Quarterly 
30: 78-102. 
 
Morck R, Shleifer A, Vishny RW.  
1988 “Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical 
analysis.” Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315. 
 
Murphy, K. J., and Zabojnik, J.  
2004 “CEO pay and appointments: A market-based explanation for 
recent trends.” The American Economic Review, 94: 192-196. 
 
 163 
 
Murray GR.  
2014 “Evolutionary preferences for physical formidability in 
leaders.” Politics and Life Sciences 33: 33-53.  
 
Nair, K. P., and Haque, W. Z.  
2016 “It's Not What I Say, but How I Sound: The Influence of CEO 
Vocal Masculinity on CEO Compensation.” Academy of 
Management Proceedings, 2016.  
 
Navarrete CD et al.  
2010 “Prejudice at the nexus of race and gender: an outgroup male 
target hypothesis.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 98: 
933. 
 
Neuberg SL, Kenrick DT, Schaller M.  
2010 “Evolutionary social psychology.” In Handbook of Social 
Psychology, Fiske ST, Gilbert DT, Lindzey G (eds.). Wiley: Hoboken, 
New Jersey, 761-796. 
 
Neuberg, S. L., and Schaller, M.  
2016 “An evolutionary threat-management approach to 
prejudices.” Current Opinion in Psychology, 7: 1-5. 
 
Ocasio W.  
1994 “Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO 
succession in US industrial  
corporations, 1960-1990.” Administrative Science Quarterly 39: 285-
312. 
 
Oldroyd, J. B., and Morris, S. S.  
2012 “Catching falling stars: A human resource response to social 
capital's detrimental effect of information overload on star 
employees.” Academy of Management Review, 37: 396-418. 
 
O'Reilly III CA, Main BG, Crystal GS.  
1988 “CEO compensation as tournament as social comparison: a 
tale of two theories.” Administrative Science Quarterly 33: 257-274. 
 164 
Oxley, D. R., Smith, K. B., Alford, J. R., Hibbing, M. V., Miller, J. L., 
Scalora, M., ... and Hibbing, J. R.  
2008 “Political attitudes vary with physiological traits.” Science, 321: 
1667-1670. 
 
Park, S. H., and Westphal, J. D.  
2013 “Social discrimination in the corporate elite: How status affects 
the propensity for minority CEOs to receive blame for low firm 
performance.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 58: 542-586.  
 
Penton-Voak, I. S., Jones, B. C., Little, A. C., Baker, S., Tiddeman, 
B., Burt, D. M., and Perrett, D. I.  
2001 “Symmetry, sexual dimorphism in facial proportions and male 
facial attractiveness.” Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 268: 
1617-1623. 
 
Petersen, M. B.  
2015 “Evolutionary political psychology.” Handbook of Evolutionary 
Psychology.  
 
Petersen, M. B., Sznycer, D., Sell, A., Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J.  
2013 “The ancestral logic of politics: Upper-body strength regulates 
men’s assertion of self-interest over economic 
redistribution.” Psychological Science, 24: 1098-1103. 
 
Petrenko OV et al.  
2015 “Corporate social responsibility or CEO narcissism? CSR 
motivations and organizational performance.” Strategic Management 
Journal 37: 262-279. 
 
Poole, K. T., and Rosenthal, H.  
1984 “The polarization of American politics.” The Journal of 
Politics, 46: 1061-1079.  
 
Porter, M. E.  
1980 Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors. New York, NY: Free Press.  
Porter, M. E.  
 165 
2008 “The five competitive forces that shape strategy.” Harvard 
business review, 86: 25-40.  
 
Puts, D. A., Apicella, C. L., and Cárdenas, R. A.  
2012 “Masculine voices signal men's threat potential in forager and 
industrial societies.” Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 279, 601–
609. 
 
Puts, D. A., Bailey, D. H., and Reno, P. L.  
2015 “Contest competition in men.” The Handbook of Evolutionary 
Psychology.  
 
Puts DA et al.  
2007 “Men”s voices as dominance signals: vocal fundamental and 
formant frequencies influence dominance attributions among men.” 
Evolution and Human Behavior 28: 340–344. 
 
Puts, D. A., Gaulin, S. J., and Verdolini, K.  
2006 “Dominance and the evolution of sexual dimorphism in human 
voice pitch.” Evolution and Human Behavior, 27: 283-296.  
 
Puts, D. A., Doll, L. M., and Hill, A. K.  
2014 “Sexual selection on human voices.” In Evolutionary 
Perspectives on Human Sexual Psychology and Behavior, 69-86. 
Springer New York. 
 
Quigley, T. J., Crossland, C., & Campbell, R. J.  
2017 “Shareholder perceptions of the changing impact of CEOs: 
Market reactions to unexpected CEO deaths, 1950–2009.” Strategic 
Management Journal, 38: 939-949. 
 
Quigley, T. J., and Hambrick, D. C.  
2015 “Has the “CEO effect” increased in recent decades?” A new 
explanation for the great rise in America's attention to corporate 
leaders. Strategic Management Journal, 36: 821-830.  
 
Sartori, A. E.  
2003 “An estimator for some binary-outcome selection models 
without exclusion restrictions.” Political Analysis 11: 111-138. 
 166 
 
Sauerwald S, Lin ZJ, Peng MW.  
2016 “Board social capital and excess CEO returns.” Strategic 
Management Journal 37: 498-520. 
 
Schaller M, Park JH, Mueller A.  
2003 “Fear of the dark: interactive effects of beliefs about danger 
and ambient darkness on ethnic stereotypes.” Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 29: 637-649. 
 
Schmidt FL, Kaplan LB.  
1971 “Composite vs. multiple criteria: a review and resolution of the 
controversy.” Personnel Psychology 24: 419–434. 
 
Scullen, S. E., Mount, M. K., and Goff, M.  
2000 “Understanding the latent structure of job performance ratings.” 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 85: 956–970. 
 
Sears, D. O., and Funk, C. L.  
1999 “Evidence of the long-term persistence of adults' political 
predispositions.” The Journal of Politics, 61: 1-28.  
 
Sell, A., Bryant, G. A., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., Sznycer, D., Von 
Rueden, C., ... and Gurven, M. 
2010 “Adaptations in humans for assessing physical strength from 
the voice.” Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 277: 3509-3518. 
 
Sell, A., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., Sznycer, D., von Rueden, C., and 
Gurven, M.  
2009 “Human adaptations for the visual assessment of strength and 
fighting ability from the body and face.” Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B, 276: 575-584.  
 
Sell, A., Hone, L. S., and Pound, N.  
2012 “The importance of physical strength to human males.” Human 
Nature, 23: 30-44. 
 
Sell A, Tooby J, Cosmides L.  
 167 
2009b “Formidability and the logic of human anger.” Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 106: 15073-15078.  
 
Semadeni, M., Withers, M. C., and Trevis Certo, S.  
2014 “The perils of endogeneity and instrumental variables in 
strategy research: Understanding through simulations.” Strategic 
Management Journal, 35: 1070-1079.  
 
Shaver JM.  
1998 “Accounting for endogeneity when assessing strategy 
performance: does entry mode choice affect FDI survival?” 
Management Science 44: 571-585. 
 
Shellenbarger S.  
2013 “Is this how you really talk?” Accessible at  
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323735604578440
851083674898 (accessed 20 April 2017). 
 
Short, J. C., Ketchen, D. J., Palmer, T. B., and Hult, G. T. M.  
2007 “Firm, strategic group, and industry influences on 
performance.” Strategic management journal, 28: 147-167.  
 
Siegel S, Castellan NJ.  
1988 Nonparametric statistics for the behavioral sciences. McGraw-
Hill. 
 
Sila V, Gonzalez A, Hagendorff J.  
2016 “Women on board: does boardroom gender diversity affect firm 
risk?”. Journal of Corporate Finance 36: 26-53. 
 
Simsek, Z.  
2007 “CEO tenure and organizational performance: An intervening 
model.” Strategic Management Journal, 28: 653-662. 
Sine WD, Haveman HA, Tolbert PS.  
2005 “Risky business? Entrepreneurship in the new independent 
power sector.” Administrative Science Quarterly 50: 200-232. 
 
Slomp, G.  
 168 
2000 “Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory.” 
Springer. 
 
Spisak, B. R., Homan, A. C., Grabo, A., and Van Vugt, M.  
2012 “Facing the situation: Testing a biosocial contingency model of 
leadership in intergroup relations using masculine and feminine 
faces.” The Leadership Quarterly, 23: 273-280.  
 
Starbuck, W. H.  
1976 “Organizations and their environments.” Handbook of Industrial 
and Organizational Psychology. 
 
Stata.  
1999 Stata reference manuals. College Station, TX: Stata. 
 
Stavrova, O., & Ehlebracht, D.  
2016 “Cynical beliefs about human nature and income: Longitudinal 
and cross-cultural analyses.” Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 110: 116.  
 
Stern, I., and Westphal, J. D.  
2010 “Stealthy footsteps to the boardroom: Executives' 
backgrounds, sophisticated interpersonal influence behavior, and 
board appointments.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 55: 278-319.  
 
Stirrat, M., & Perrett, D. I.  
2010 “Valid facial cues to cooperation and trust: Male facial width 
and trustworthiness.” Psychological science, 21: 349-354. 
 
Stirrat, M., Stulp, G., & Pollet, T. V.  
2012 “Male facial width is associated with death by contact violence: 
narrow-faced males are more likely to die from contact 
violence.” Evolution and Human Behavior, 33: 551-556. 
 
Tetlock, P. E.  
2000 ‘‘Cognitive biases and organizational correctives: Do both 
disease and cure depend on the politics of the beholder?’’ 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 45: 293–326.  
 
 169 
Thomsen S, Pedersen T, Kvist HK.  
2006 “Blockholder ownership: Effects on firm value in market and 
control based governance systems.” Journal of Corporate 
Finance 12: 246-269.  
 
Tigue, C. C., Borak, D. J., O'Connor, J. J., Schandl, C., and 
Feinberg, D. R.  
2012 “Voice pitch influences voting behavior.” Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 33: 210-216.  
 
Useem M.  
1984 The inner circle (Vol. 617). Oxford University Press: New York. 
 
Vafeas, N.  
1999 “Board meeting frequency and firm performance.” Journal of 
financial economics, 53: 113-142.  
 
Vancil, R. F.  
1987 “Passing the baton: Managing the Process of CEO 
Succession.” Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Van Reenen J.  
2011 “Does competition raise productivity through improving 
management quality?” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 29: 306-316. 
 
Van Vugt M.  
2006 “Evolutionary origins of leadership and followership.” 
Personality and Social Psychology Review 10: 354-371.  
 
Van Vugt M, De Cremer D, Janssen DP.  
2007 “Gender differences in cooperation and competition.” 
Psychological Science 18: 19-23. 
 
Van Vugt M, Ronay R.  
2014 “The evolutionary psychology of leadership: theory, review, 
and roadmap.” Organizational Psychology Review 4: 74-95. 
 
Vigil, J. M.  
 170 
2010 “Political leanings vary with facial expression processing and 
psychosocial functioning.” Group Processes and Intergroup 
Relations, 13: 547-558.  
 
Von Rueden, C.  
2014 “The roots and fruits of social status in small-scale human 
societies.” The Psychology of Social Status, 179-200. Springer, New 
York, NY. 
  
Wade J, O'Reilly III CA, Chandratat I.  
1990 “Golden parachutes: CEOs and the exercise of social 
influence.” Administrative Science Quarterly 35: 587-603.  
 
Walker RS, Bailey DH.  
2013 “Body counts in lowland South American violence.” Evolution 
and Human Behavior 34: 29-34. 
 
Wells, J. C.  
2012 “Sexual dimorphism in body composition across human 
populations: associations with climate and proxies for short‐and 
long‐term energy supply.” American Journal of Human Biology, 24: 
411-419.  
Westphal, J. D., and Bednar, M. K.  
2005 “Pluralistic ignorance in corporate boards and firms' strategic 
persistence in response to low firm performance.” Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 50: 262-298. 
 
Westphal JD, Clement MB.  
2008 “Sociopolitical dynamics in relations between top managers 
and security analysts: favor rendering, reciprocity, and analyst stock 
recommendations.” Academy of Management Journal 51: 873-897.  
 
Westhal JD, Deephouse DL.  
2011 “Avoiding bad press: interpersonal influence in relations 
between CEOs and journalists and the consequences for press 
reporting about firms and their leadership.” Organization Science 
22:1061-1086. 
 
Westphal JD, Stern I.  
 171 
2007 “Flattery will get you everywhere (especially if you are a male 
Caucasian): How ingratiation, boardroom behavior, and 
demographic minority status affect additional board appointments at 
US companies.” Academy of Management Journal 50: 267-288. 
 
Westphal JD, Stern I.  
2006 “The other pathway to the boardroom: interpersonal influence 
behavior as a substitute for elite credentials and majority status in 
obtaining board appointments.” Administrative Science Quarterly 51: 
169-204. 
 
Westphal, J. D., and Stern, I.  
2007 “Flattery will get you everywhere (especially if you are a male 
Caucasian): How ingratiation, boardroom behavior, and 
demographic minority status affect additional board appointments at 
US companies.” Academy of Management Journal, 50: 267-288.  
 
Westphal, J. D., and Zajac, E. J.  
1995 “Who shall govern? CEO/board power, demographic similarity, 
and new director selection.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 40: 
60-83.  
 
Westphal, J. D., and Zajac, E. J.  
2013 “A behavioral theory of corporate governance: Explicating the 
mechanisms of socially situated and socially constituted 
agency.” Academy of Management Annals, 7: 607-661.  
 
Whyte MK.  
1978 The Status of Women in Preindustrial Societies. Princeton 
University Press: Princeton, NJ. 
 
Williams CE, Stevens KN.  
1972 “Emotions and speech: some acoustical correlates.” The 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of North America 52: 1238-1250. 
 
Wilson PR.  
1968 “Perceptual distortion of height as a function of ascribed 
academic status.” The Journal of Social Psychology 74: 97-102.  
 
 172 
Winegard BM, Winegard BM, Deaner RO.  
2014 “Misrepresentations of evolutionary psychology in sex and 
gender textbooks.” Evolutionary Psychology 12: 474-508. 
 
Wolff, S. E., and Puts, D. A.  
2010 “Vocal masculinity is a robust dominance signal in men.” 
Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 64: 1673–1683. 
 
Wong, E. M., Ormiston, M. E., & Haselhuhn, M. P.  
2011 “A face only an investor could love: CEOs’ facial structure 
predicts their firms’ financial performance.” Psychological 
Science, 22: 1478-1483. 
 
Wowak, A. J., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., and Steinbach, A. L.  
2017 “Inducements and motives at the top: A holistic perspective on 
the drivers of executive behavior.” Academy of Management 
Annals, 11: 669-702. 
 
Yap AJ, Mason MF, Ames DR.  
2013 “The powerful size others down: the link between power and 
estimates of others' size.” Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 49: 591-594. 
 
Zajac, E. J., and Westphal, J. D.  
1996 “Who shall succeed? How CEO/board preferences and power 
affect the choice of new CEOs.” Academy of Management Journal, 
39: 64-90. 
 
Zhang Y, Qu H.  
2015 “The impact of CEO succession with gender change on firm 
performance and successor early departure: evidence from China”s 
publicly listed companies in 1997-2010.” Academy of Management 
Journal 59: 1845-1868. 
 
Zhang Y, Rajagopalan N.  
2003 “Explaining new CEO origin: firm versus industry antecedents.” 
Academy of Management Journal 46: 327–338. 
 
Zhang Y, Rajagopalan N.  
 173 
2010 “Once an outsider, always an outsider? CEO origin, strategic 
change, and firm performance.” Strategic Management Journal 31: 
334-346. 
 
Zhu, D. H.  
2013 “Group polarization on corporate boards: Theory and evidence 
on board decisions about acquisition premiums.” Strategic 
Management Journal, 34: 800-822. 
 
Zhu, D. H.  
2014 “Group polarization in board decisions about CEO 
compensation.” Organization Science, 25: 552-571. 
 
Zhu, D. H., Shen, W., and Hillman, A. J.  
2014 “Recategorization into the in-group: The appointment of 
demographically different new directors and their subsequent 
positions on corporate boards.” Administrative Science Quarterly, 
59: 240-270. 
 
 
Zhu, D. H., and Westphal, J. D.  
2014 “How directors' prior experience with other demographically 
similar CEOs affects their appointments onto corporate boards and 
the consequences for CEO compensation.” Academy of 
Management Journal, 57: 791-813.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 175 
English Summary  
 
The large body body of literature on corporate leadership is diverse 
in many dimensions, but the studies in this area typically share an 
underlying (if implicit) belief that social forces are the primary driver 
of perceptions and behavior. While acknowledging the relevance of 
these social factors, I suggest that there is the potential to 
substantially advance our understanding of executive behavior by 
considering a very different perspective; namely, one that is rooted 
in biological rather than social explanations. Building on recent 
research in evolutionary psychology, the three papers in this 
dissertation examine how biological signals of fighting ability that 
appear in the face and voice affect executive behavior, selection, 
and compensation. This work contributes to the corporate leadership 
literature by introducing a unique perspective that complements 
existing approaches to studying the drivers of corporate leader 
perceptions and behavior. 
 
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
  
De literatuur inzake het bestuur van organisaties is divers op 
uiteenlopende manieren, maar de studies delen vaak een 
onderliggende overtuiging dat sociale krachten primaire drijfveren 
zijn van percepties en gedragingen. Ondanks dat ik de relevantie 
van deze sociale krachten erken, suggereer ik dat er een potentieel 
is om ons begrip van bestuurlijk gedrag te vergroten door een ander 
perspectief te overwegen; namelijk, één die is geworteld in 
biologische verklaringen in plaats van sociale. Voortbouwend op 
recente onderzoek in evolutionaire psychologie, onderzoek ik 
middels de drie artikelen in deze dissertatie hoe bestuurlijk gedrag, 
selectie en compensatie beïnvloed worden door biologische signalen 
met betrekking tot de capaciteit om fysieke conflicten te winnen die 
zich manifesteren op het gezicht en in de stem. Dit werk draagt bij 
aan de literatuur inzake het bestuur van organisaties door een uniek 
perspectief te introduceren dat bestaande benaderingen 
complementeert inzake de drijfveren van percepties en gedragingen 
van bestuurders. 
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